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PREFACES
The question of control versus the free market de
termination of the foreign exchange rate has become vital
ly important due to the increased emphasis that has been
placed upon international political and economic unity as
a means of securing world peace.

Nationalistic restric

tions, such as exchange controls, imposed on foreign trade
are a serious obstacle to the success of the plans for
world unity.

On the basis of economic theory and an un

biased appraisal of the facts it would seem that the na
tions of the world would be all to happy to return to
freely determined foreign exchange rates, however, as with
all types of restrictions, exchange controls are easy to
impose, but most difficult to remove,

fbe difficulties

are intensified when nations are unwilling or politically
unable to pursue the policies needed to make the correc
tions which would make controls unnecessary.

In the eight

year period 1945-53 following world War 11 Canada has been
the only major nation to succeed in completely removing
foreign exchange controls*

The Canadian experience offers

an important lesson to nations in a similar situation.
In the post-World War II period administration of
the foreign exchange rate has been an extremely trouble-

some aspect of international trade policy for many coon*
tries#;

In the immediate postwar period the majority of

nations./conUntied to use their wartime exchange control#
as ;a mean# of .dealing with the problems that'arose in
their hal#nce of payments *

In discussions of bo th econom

ic theory arid policy it ha# been repeated oyer and Oyer
again.that- .exchange controls are only an expedient device
used to secure time to make fundamental adjustments*

fa

fact* however, exchange control# have persisted since
their widespread introduction during the depression of the
10 :$0 l#^;a»d at present it appears that they will persist

much ■lunger*'iSvidence indicates that once a nation imi "

•

.

poses ©xchangeeontrols they, assume a more or less perma
nent character and it is only with great difficulty that
a nation can remove them, if, indeed* they are ever com*
pletely removed#
the theoretical issues involved in the use of ex#
change controls" are guile.clear*■ the exchange rate is the
liiijk. be'tween 'the-internal and external -sector# of a par
ticular national economy*

it is through the balance of

payments and' the exchange rate that external factors and
event# affect the domestic economy; the classical theory
of |international'--trade attempts to formulate and present ■
ther free functioning of this mechanism in hypothetical and

abstract theoretical terms,

the function of exchange con

trols, has, on the other hand, always been ®justified1* on
political and social grounds.

One does not argue with the

theory of international trade and the equilibrating fune tion of the exchange rate that the theory presents*

Hew-

ever, one may easily dispute the desirability of an ad
justment in the domestic economy that is necessary to
bring external trade into balance, especially when such
adjustments are fundamental and have far-reaching social
effects,

in the classic general theory of international

trade and the determination of the exchange rate social
questions are, ignored as are other facts such as a na
tion's relative state of economic development and the par
ticular national economic and social environment,

these

factors, however, are of primary importance to a national
policy making body that is attempting to evaluate the ef
fect of the exchange rate upon the domestic economy.
Therefore, one of the most significant independent vari
ables in the’'existence of exchange controls is not Econom
ic theory, but the point, of view of the national policy
making administration#

the classic economic policy of

free trade, which is a derivative of economic theory, is
advocated in principle throughout the world, but in prac
tice many policy making groups find that it is advanta

vi
geous to ignore the -theory and policy when they are deal*
IS

.

.

ing with real situations and political pressure is brought
to bear.

Consequently, to understand a particular na

tion *s approach to the question of exchange control it is
necessary to take into account all the special factors and
situations that a national policy making body must consid
er,.

Only when all these factors are considered can one

begin to understand a phenomena like exchange control that
exists in the real world, but which is impossible and un
necessary in the perfect world visualized by economic
theory,
Canada*s experience with exchange control offers an
excellent opportunity to study how in practice such con
trols originate, are applied, and, especially in the case
of Canada, how the controls may outlive their usefulness.
The most important aspect of the Canadian experience is
that, due to the unique Canadian position in foreign trade,
the Canadian dollar is one of the few important currencies
in the world that has passed through the full cycle of
control and has returned to the free determination of the
external rate,

A.case study of the Canadian decision to

free exchanges, the important factors in the process that
led to this decision, and the relation of the actual expe
rience to economic theory may, it is Hoped, help

to shed

some light on possible ways of solving sisailar problems in
other nations^;
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CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

I*

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY

One of the most striking geophysical aspects of Cana
da is the fact that natural physical barriers running in a
northerly and southerly direction divide the country into
four distinct geographic areas on an easi-west plane#

These

areas and the barriers that create the® are as follows!
(1) the Maritime Provinces (Prince Edward Island* Nova Sco
tia, and New Brunswick)* which make up the southeastern coast
of Canada* are separated from the rest of the nation by the
difficult terrain in which the Appalachians meet the Canadi
an Shield at the northern projection of the international
boundary line* (2) Central Canada (the Provinces of Ontario
and Quebec * particularly the area known as the St* Lawrence
Lowlands* comprising the Niagara Peninsula and the valleys
of the Ottawa and St* Lawrence rivers) is isolated from the
western prairie region by eight hundred miles of barren
country in which the Canadian Shield meets the Great Lakes *
(3) the Prairie Provinces (Manitoba* Saskatchewan* and Alber
ta) are cut off from the Pacific coast by the northern exten
sion of the Rocky Mountains* (4) the Pacific coast Province
of British Columbia* which lies on the western side* is large'

2

ly isolated from the rest of Canada by the Eocky Mountain
barrier,
A further complication and limitation of the Canadian
geographic situation is the fact that the region to the
north of each of these geographic areas is generally forest
or tundra wasteland.

The situation then is one in which the

real shape of Canada as an economic and social unit is that
of a narrow strip running east and west which is bordered in
the north by tundra wastes and in the south by the United
States#

This strip, however, is not continuous but divided

into four areas as described above#

The result of this geo

graphic configuration is that east-west transportation and
communication is difficult and costly; a situation that has
fostered the development of reasonably discrete economies in
each of the geographic areas.

While it is true that the se»

riousness of this condition has been somewhat mitigated by
the development of railroads and other forms of transporta**
tion, yet many of the geographic handicaps to economic inte
gration still persist, with more than vestigial remnants,
and traces of the old economic isolation that existed before
the new forms of transportation can still be found.

It is

this situation that leads McLeod to summarize the Canadian
economy as "Canada is not so much a single economy as a fe

3
1
deration ©f diverse economies."
II.

THE CANADIAN BALANCE SHEET

Perhaps the best approach to the problem of summa
rizing the resources and activities of the Canadian economy
is in forms resembling the corporate balance sheet and in
come statement.

The balance sheet,which is concerned with

an account of the economy*s human, natural, and man-made re
sources, will be treated at this point.
The population of Canada is much like that of the
doited States in that it has the rather unique characteris
tic of being non-native or immigrant in origin*

Because of

this fact the economic development of Canada has been inti
mately associated with and dependent upon the flow of immi
grants*

Evidence of this dependence is found in the fact

that in the last decade the population of Canada has, part
ly as a result of natural increase and partly as a result of
immigration, grown from eleven and a half million in 1941 to
fourteen million in 1952.

This represents an increase of

sixteen percent in Canada as compared with only twelve per
cent in the United States during the same period.

The dif

1
Alexander M. McLeod, "Maintaining Employment and In
come in Canada," (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard
University, Cambridge, 1949), p. 28.

ference between the American and Canadian figure is mainly
due to immigration.2

Huch of Canada’s future economic pros-

perity is dependent upon the continuation of this inflow of
immigrants, because as the nation’s capital resources grow,
as they are doing at present, the greater the manpower re
quired to utilize them.

It does not appear that the present

population could multiply fast enough to meet the require
ments, therefore, it is necessary for Canada to have a con
tinuous inflow of immigrants if the present rate of indus
trial development is to continue.

However, it would be er

roneous to take the view that iust the continued supply of
immigrants is the sine qua non of Canadian* economic develop
ment, because, as N. Burton Hurd points out, **. . . i n the
past, Canada’s population growth, rather than being limited
by a shortage of available settlers was regulated by exter3
nal forces largely beyond her immediate control*n
The ex
ternal forces to which Hurd refers are the world markets for
Canadian export commodities.

It folloirs that successful po

pulation assimilation in Canada is dependent upon the coadi-

%raham F. Towers, “Current Banking Problems,*1 Pro
ceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Pacific Northwest ConTerehc'e 'on ’‘
Banking {SeaitleY State College of Washington,19^3),
ip.' '&•
%llliam Burton Hurd, “Demographic Trends in Canada,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci----------------------0000 '
; CTOlurC’
SepTemHer'; E m

tions in the world markets in which Canada mast sell a large
portion of her produce.

Consequently, Canada is in a posi*

tion where she must not only depend upon external sources for
a supply of immigrants necessary to keep her population grow
ing in proportion to needs, hat also must depend upon extern
nal conditions to make, the continued growth possible.
In relation to the vast land area of Canada the pre
sent population is very sroall,

the present total population

of 14,009,429 results in an average distribution of only
3*8$ persons per square mile for the total Canadian area of
3,845,144 square miles*

However, this distribution figure

is very deceptive since it seems to indicate that Canada is
only sparsely settlpd*

On the contrary, some areas are

densely populated, for example. Prince Edward Island with
45.07 persons per square mile and Nova Scotia with 30*98 per
sons per square mile.

As previously noted only, a small por

tion of the total Canadian area comprises the economic and
social unit of the nation*

It is within this small area of

roughly 800,000 square miles that the population of Canada
is concentrated, the remainder being sparsely populated by
persons living on outposts where they carry on same, mining
and fur trading*

The population, however, is not diatribe

uted evenly within the small concentrated area that makes up
the economic and social unit*

the largest concentrations of

population are in the Provinces! of Ontario and Quebec in
Central Canada*

These two Provinces alone account for sixty

percent of the total Canadian population and five and a half
raillion of the seven and a half rail!ion urban dwellers*
These population figures seem to indicate that only a small
portion of Canada is undergoing any intensive economic de
velopment.

-fSls condition becomes more evident when the

distribution of population is related to natural resources.
Concerning mineral resources, Canada is one Of the
most richly endowed nations in the world today.

However,

many of these resources are undeveloped due to the economic
disadvantage of high transportation costs imposed by the
vast area and difficult terrain of Canada,

©espite this

handicap the extractive industries are one of the most ener
getic segments of the Canadian economy.

Oil can be cited as

one of the numerous examples of Canada’s richness in natural
resources.

Table I shows that since 1940 Canada has devel*

oped oil producing areas in Alberta which at present are
producing ninety-six percent of all Canadian oil.

The pic*

tore seems to bid fair for the future of Canada who has been
a major importer of petroleum in the past*

However, it is

typical of the Canadian situation that, because of transpor
tation difficulties, the oil produced mainly in the north
west cannot economically reach the large markets jg the east#

7
tAJBIl I
QUAHtltlES ABS VALUES OF CffiJDS PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
IS CASAM, 3T PROVINCES, 1942-1951

Year

New
Ontario
Brunswick

Alberta

Saskat- Northwest
ehewan territories

total
Canada

Quantities (in barrels)
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
194?
1948
1949
1950
1951

28*089
24,530
23,296

30,140
28,584
23,129

21,372
19,544
17,13?
15,000

143,845
132,492
125,06?
113,325
123,082

10,117,073
9,601,530
8,727,366
7*979*786
7,137,921

131,295
176,989
260,670
250,655
201,800

6,770,47?
540,117
849,166
10,888,592
782,188
20,087,418
1,041,098
27,548,169
46,403,000 1,250,000

75,789
293.750
1,223,675
14,374 345,171
118,686 177,282
227,4?4
350,541
155,528
186,729
215,000

10,364,796
10,052,302
10,099,404
8,482,796
7,585,555
7,692,492
12,286,660
21,305,348
29,043,788
48 ,096,800

Values (in Canadian dollars)
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
194?
1948
19*9
1950
1951

39,467
34,342
32,832
42,413
,40,018

306,242
311,356
296,420
268,478
291,719

32,381

350.000 18,078,90?
614,156
976,541
608,109
35,127,751
901,143 58,999,936
836,941
892.000 82,216,492 1,134,797
706,000 118,684,350 1,562,000

29,920
27,362

23,992
21,000

15,514,665
15.724,518
14,468,061
13,169,692
14,347,933

• • ■

15»!362
135,990

Source: Canada Year Book: 1952-53. p. 529*

108,47?
400,201
632,587
136,303
173,392

15,968,851
16,470,417
15.429,900
13,632,248
14,989,052

500,238 19,575,682
676,574 37,418,895
353,108 61,118,490
352,656 84,619,937
404,200 121,407,550

Therefore it is cheaper for eastern users to import Venezue
lan or American oil*

Barring the possibility of developing

low cost means of transportation, the Canadians hope that
they will at least be able to reach a balance in which they
will be exporting as much oil as they import.^
Other important mineral developments include aluminum
in British Columbia and iron ore in Quebec and Ontario*
J* i. McCully, an executive of the Bank of Montreal, has
said that recent discoveries make Canada a land of even
greater promise than the United States in the next decade*®
The extractive industries also offer an excellent
example of the tremendous expansion programs that are now
under way in Canada*

These programs are the result of new

discoveries, but possibly even more, the result of the in
creased demand by countries such as the United States for
raw materials for their speeded up armaments programs.

Ta

ble II shows the proposed expenditure in this area of the
economy and the expected increase -in productive capacity*
It will be this increase in productive capacity, which in

^Canadian Grade Petroleum Situation,11 Canada Tear
Book? 1B52-53 , pp. 526-27*
■ r:'"r"ri,r:v1
®*Tohn E. HcCully, ^Prospects for Creator Industrial
Expansion in Canada;1* Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
CLXXIII (January 25 , 1 W T 7 H 7 7
-r
r

TABLE |I
BBVBLOfWEfeU OP « » f » W

IMPOSES? EESOtJfiGPS

‘ mmmrW5Q-l$&

■ ■

pass? i
n f m tmtsmstoi i w m & s m - m
.■ m m m m m w s , amb mcsiKir
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

f.
In v © e tm © a i

Industry

Aluminum smelting
v buvT nOIi^lfsFryUo .filQvAa.8#
Smelting, refining, and
processing
Iron ore mining
Primary iron and steel
Petroleum and natural gas*
(a) Exploration and
flsreinpssai*
(b) frsnsmission and
refining :
Chemical produets*#
fotals
Kydro-eiectrie-power

,1950
(Actual)

1951
(Prel.j1

falue of Expansion
Projects M m Being
undertaken for Cora*
pletion in 1955 or
Before

18*2

233

192
5.7
15.?

5*0
23.8
66.9

150
226

<&*>

70*9

300

21.5
32.8 •

37-7
6A.3

213
127

88

160.?

286,8

1

3^.5

%G3.8

1,200

•Excluding acquisition Of land rights.
••Including jtetro-chemic&l projects.

*3 3 ?

10

TABLE II (continued)
PART II
SELECTED MINERALS} ESTIMATES
Of TOTAL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
(Thousands of Short Tons Unless Otherwise Stated)

Materials

Actual
Output
1950

Petroleum (crude)*
1,000 bble. per day 80
Primary aluminum
395
Iron ore
3.617
Copper (all forms)
262
Lead (all forms)
170
Zinc (all forms)
Nickel (all forms)
Tungsten
(U03 content)
Cohalt
Magnesium
Dolmen!te
Primary steel
ingot
Elemental sulphur

311

123
0.001

0.313
1.8

Estimated
Capacity
1950

80

Estimated
Capacity
1955

Percent Increase
la Capacity
1950-55

250

210

*15
3,617
272 **
190**

603
19,000
300
205

*30
10
8

320**
137

*06

0.001
0.313
5 .0

155
2
0,600

5.0

*5

27
13
* •

95
0

100

100

550

*5 0

3,300

3,700

*,*00
81

21

«»

a•

* ♦

•Maximum economic rate— annual average.
••Eased on the highest quarterly rate of output during 1950 *
Source; Hansard, Oct. 19, 1951, as quoted by: Investment Broker
Association Comalttee on Canada, Commercial and financial Chronicle.
GLB3V (Deo. 13, 1951), 2271.
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most cases is far xa excess of what the Canadian economy can
itself consume, that will be meant for the export trade.
There is also another type of natural resource with
which Canada has been especially blessed— fertile land.
Even though it is true that the area of fertile land is lim
ited and that at present, if new developments were started,
it would have to be on submarginal land, there is still,
however, some hope for continued agricultural development in
the Canadian economy since there is ample evidence that the
ir,

present agricultural development is extensive rather than
intensive*

One of the best indications of this is that at

present the largest single crop is wheat which requires a
great deal of land for its cultivation.

The fertility of

the soil is evidenced by the fact that the wheat farmers are
capable of producing crops so much in excess of the Canadian
domestic demand that wheat is one of the largest Canadian
exports.

If Canada lacks anything in the way of land assets,

it is diversified farm land.

The climate and soil condi*

tions lisait this type of farming to mainly some areas in the
Earitime Provinces, the eastern section of Central Canada,
and the far western section of the Prairie Provinces.
The type of industry that the Canadian economy with
its wealth of natural resources and relative shortage of
manpower is best suited to carry on is one that requires a

12
high degree hf capital.afiliaatioa.

Consequently, Canadian

industry is not generally in the highly industrialized ,
class} it is chiefly concerned with the processing of raw
materials,

this type of industrial activity requires large

capital outlays for bulky equipment and large plants*
To sum up, Canada with its vast area <Some of which
has not been adequately explored) and abundant resources
(some of which cannot be developed because of high labor and
transportation costs) constitutes a great potential develop*
ment*

Canada, then, is a nation that is favored on the as

set side of the balance sheet*

Xt is not just the fact that

she possesses these riches that is significant} rather it is
their location and the particular way they are being uti
lized that has the distinguishing effect on the Canadian
economy*.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine the actual

distribution of resources and the industries based on them
to appreciate their contribution to the nafioa*s economy*
The Maritime Provinces account for about ten percent
of Canada*s population*

The chief industries are agricul

ture , fishing, forestry, and mining (especially coal in le
va Scotia)*

The manufacturing enterprise of this area has a

difficult time competing with Central Canada for the general
Canadian market*

This difficulty is especially manifest in

the marketing of coal and steel because of the nearness of

13

American sources to the principal industrial market for
these commodities in Central Canada,
Economically the most ^important district of Central
Canada is the St, Lav/renee Lowlands which is made up of the
narrow strip lying between the Canadian Shield to the north
and the international boundary to the south.

This area ac

commodates over sixty percent of the nation*s population.
It is within this region that the most important development
of Canadian industry has taken place.

One of the chief con

tributing reasons for this development is the proximity of
cheap abundant water power, but an even more important fac
tor is the fact that the Lowlands is situated in a position
that is easily accessible to eastward trade with Europe by
sea through the St. Lawrence.

Industry is not the only

economic activity of the region.

To the north of the Canadi

an Shield agriculture, forest products, and mining are also
important.

Huch of the Canadian production of gold and base

metals comes from this north central zone.

The lack of coal

has not hampered the growth of heavy industry in the Low
lands, because of the nearness of American fields and the
economic advantage of cheap transportation over the Great
Lakes.

The heavy demand of Central Canadian industry for

American coal has tended to develop strong trade ties be
tween this area and the United States.

The Lowlands also

14
acts as the central distributing and transshipping point for
all of Canada.

The greatest share of the exports of this

region goes to the United States; the region also accounts
for a large share of Canadian imports in the form of indus
trial raw materials, component parts, and heavy machines
which are used to further the industrialization of the area*
This vast concentration of the manufacturing of the
nation into one comparatively small area can be explained by
the fact that it is the one area that is centrally located
and has the advantage of natural lines of east-west communi
cation and transportation, plus easy and cheap means of
southward transportation*

The economic significance of the

Central Canadian region is that historically it has served
as the hub from which expansion has taken place*

However,

because of the lack of large population movements, industry
has stayed concentrated in the area and economic development
became largely a process of opening up more and more re
sources in the interior and bringing them out to the markets
of the world*

The Lowlands is the natural distribution cen

ter for this expansion*

The home market in Canada has been

steadily growing, but the production of important basic com
modities has always been far ahead of domestic consumption;
this situation has made the existence of a central concen
tration point for export trade necessary and profitable.

15
the Prairie Provinces in the interior plains region
account for something over twenty percent of the Canadian
population* .Agriculture is the principal Industryof the '
praifies* although there are somecomaercial forest products
found, andsom© extractive industry, especially coal and Oil
in Alberta.

However, wheat growing dominates the area*

the

wheat crop which is grown in this region is one of the main*-*
stays of Canadian export trade,
crop is western Europe,

fh® market for much of the

this market has been traditionally

served through feritaia, mainly by the Liverpool grain ex*
change.
fritisfe Columbia, the last of the economic regions of
Canada, has about six or seven percent Of the total popula
tion*

fhe principal products of this region come from the

mines, fishing, and agriculture of the area.

Much of the

produce of the region is sold in the Prairie Provinces .or
exported to the western section of the United States*

Since

the opening of the Panama Canal made cheap ocean transport
available,, many products,, especially forest products* are
sold in the eastern United States and Burope.
It appears that because of the geographic* economic,
and social reasons the Canadian economy has developed along
■the lines of a wheel? Central Canada is: the .hub"fro® which,
radiates the population and manufactured goods of the nation*
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the most distinct feature resulting from this condition of
the Canadian economy is the concentration of production on
just a few major products which can he produced in large
quantities at low cost*

Consequently* Canadian economic

history has been; the story of a development based upon one
or a few staple commodities such as wheat, lumber’
, pulp and
paper, fish, and base metals*

this is one of the most sig

nificant aspects of the economy because, judging from pre
sent standards of consumption, it appears that there is lit
tle chance of having in Canada for many years to come suffi
cient urban population to consume the present surpluses of
the leading products*6

Therefore, the Canadian stake in in

ternational trade is high, and trade matters are one of the
principal concerns of the nation*

Confirmation of this con

tention will be found in the following analysis of the Cana
dian income statement*
III.

THE CANADIAN INCOME STATEMENT

The foregoing presentation of Canadian resources has
given some indication of what the Canadian economy is*

The

following brief survey of the Canadian net national produc
tion of commodities and the balance of payments on current

% u r d , 0£.
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account will attempt to show what it does.
Table III shows the values added by the various industries to the net value of commodity production.

Table IV

interprets these values in terms of percentages of total com
modity production,

One of the most striking features of the

figures presented in Table IV is that secondary commodity
production forms a relatively small portion of total produc
tion t i.e. only sixty percent,

What is not so readily ap

parent is that a sizeable portion of the secondary produc
tion figure represents manufacturing based on raw material
processing and other industries whose main products are semi
manufactured goods that are not meant for consumption in Canada.
Table IV also indicates a heavy concentration in ag
riculture,

A very large portion of this figure is due to

wheat production which is one of the largest single sources
of farm income.

Canada is the second largest world produc

er of wheat and produces much more than the small popula-

'Table III includes only industries involved in the
actual production of commodities. Other services such as
those rendered by transport, communication, trade, and finan
cial industries have been entirely excluded. This is quite
different from the gross national product which includes all
industries; however, the figures presented are well adapted
for the purpose of showing how the Canadian economy utilizes
its resources.
8*Table 3, Net Value of Products in Processing In
dustries,11 Canada Year Book; 1952-53, p, 370*
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INMSTRZES, 1944-1949
(Millions of Canadian Bollars)
ii'"im,.i.vj.',i,'
.
1

Industry
Apiculture
forestry'
fisheries
Trapping
Mining
Electric power
less duplication in
'forestry*1*
Total primary
production
Construction
Custom and rep&irv
Manufactures
less 'duplication in
manufactures*** :
Total secondary
production
Orana total

1944

1944

1947

1948

1,468 1 , m
2,046
■■954 , 1,070
711
108
110
■ 127
20
17
31
728
422 • 552
221
232
249

1949
2,02?
1,056*
119

■tw

1,26$
551
193
22
413

219

210

61

65

.7k

89

100

100

8,744

2,504

2,837

3,284

4,141

4.188

84$
165
k,m

268
170
3, m

• #09
• 213
3,467

602

247
4,292

830
279

4,940

1,067*
292
5,331*

k3?

428

519

737

838

881*

4,430

4,010

4,089

5,141

6,049

6,737

6,986

6,458

7,68?

9,351 1 9,997

M3*.
50?
77

2k

IS

800*
270*

6,689

*lipiuda® Se»(foafl.dlaa3..
♦♦Slimlnateeau^^

between agrlcoltmre and forestry totals*
includes sawmills, pulp end paper mills, etc.,
'fi&cb' are also included under tlie heading atom.
Sourest Oaafeda Year Book: 1952-51. f , 369.

19
TABL3 XT
m m s m w s aialysis or 5®
taltje or psoductigs,
BY ISBOSTRIES, 1944, 1946-1949

Industry

Percentage of Total Set Production
:. ■
.. ...
1944

1946

194?

1948

l$k9

Agriculture
forestry
Fisheries
Trapping
Mining
Slectrie power
Less duplication In
forestry ,

22.8
7.5
1.1
Q.4
6,7
3.0

22*7
11.0
1.7
0.5
6.5
3.**

19.6
12.5

1.4
0.2
7.2
3.0

21.9
11.4
1.4
0.2
7.8
2.7

20.3
10.6
1.2
0.1
8,0
2.7

O.f

1.1

1.2

1.1

1.0

Total prinary production

40,7

44.7

42.7

44.3

41.9

3*7

7.8
3*2

8 .9

10,7

3.0

2 .9

55.9

5 2 .8

53-3

Construction
Custom and repair
Manufactures
less duplication in
nauufactures

59.6

6.3
3.3
53.7

'■6 ,5

8.0

9 .6

9*0

8 .8

Total secondary
production

65.6

63.3

66.9

64.7

66.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Grand total

2 .5

Source: Canada Year Book? 1952-53. p. J?Q.

tion of Canada can consume in any one year*
true of forestry*

the nan* ia

the domestic consumption of forest pro*

ducts is small in relation to the total amount produced, and,
as in the case of wheat, the difference is made up by for*
eiga sales.
The next section of the income statement deals with
the balance of payments and is intended to show the source
and proportion of the national income which comes from for
eign trade.
The data shown in Table

V

indicate that merchandise

exports are the largest and most important factor in the
balance on current account,®

Baring the inter-war period

Canada*s exports on current account were equal to about
10
twenty-five percent of the national income.
This means
that three out of every eight persons employed in Canada find
their occupation in the export industry.

This has a very

considerable effect on the Canadian economy, because at pre
sent such a large portion of the economy is concerned with
the export trade that there is little hope that with any
thing short of an economic revolution, which would be very
painful, of separating the volume of exports and the level of

®A1though invisible items are of some importance in
the Canadian balance of payments, they are not crucial,
1, Jackson, "Effects of Foreign Tirade on Canadian
and U.S. Industry," Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
CLXIII (February 21,1946), 961,
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TABUS *
BAXANG'I! Of PATM3HTS OS C0BBBUT ITEMS BST’
GAIfAM AHD ALL CQU5TRIBS, 1946-1951
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

Item
A.

1946

1948

1949

1950

1951
(Prel

Current credits?
Merchandise exports (adjusted)
2,393 2,723 3,030 2,989 3,139 3.950
• »*
* e*
Official contributions
• as
*
•
165
57
Bet exports of non-aonetary gold
119
96
150
99
163
139
286
221
Tourist and travel expenditures
271
251
275
279
70
62
Interest and dividends
70
91
83
115
303
284
322
freight and shipping
336
337
311
2?4
All other current credits
289
291
277
313
353

Total current credits
B.

194?

3,365 3,746 4,147 4,077 4,300 5,341

Current debits;
1,822 2,535 2,598 2 ,696 3,129 4,103
Merchandise imports (adjusted)
226
Tourist and travel expenditures
192
280
167
135
133
474
44?
Interest and dividends
312
325
390
337
219
freight and shipping
278
279
253
391
347
38
Official contributions
see
165
19
57
9?
417
344
341
442
All other current debits
359
523

+ 4?

Source; Canada Tear Bootet 1952*53 > p. 981.

+ 452

w-

* 363

Bet balance on current account

'A
'
g

C.

*rv

3,002 3,699 3,695 3.890 4,629

CO

Total current debits

+ 187 - 329 - 524

national prosperity*3'1

Even if Ganadais wartime prosperity

is projected through the postwar period anti, if domestic
consumption is as high or higher than the prewar 1evel, the
volume of exports will Still he a problem, because domestic
consumption will not he high enough to absorb the maximum
output of the present Canadian industrial and raw material
producing plant.

The effect of export volume on Canadian

prosperity is such that in addition to the usual situation
in which Canadian exports and national income tend to rise,
and fall in unison with variations in prosperity there is
also a close observable relationship between exports In a
■ ■ 1 2
given year and the national income in the following year*
XV.

THE GAM BIA # EXPORT ECONOMY

The description above suggests that the Canadian
economy is the 11open" type# i.e. an important portion of
the aggregate outlay for the purchase of the products of
the domestic economy comes from abroad*1^

Several terms

■^K. S. Harris, “Canada's Industrial Transformation,#
Harvard Business Review. XXII {January* 1944), 166.
12«FacRs on finds that “Taking exports from 1923 to
1938 inclusive and comparing the® with national income from
1924 to 1939 inclusive we find that the coefficient of cor
relation is + .923, remarkably high," Jackson, op. cit.,
p, 963,
^ J o h n Archibald Stovel, “Canadian Balance of Pay
ments” (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard Univer
sity, Cambridge, 1949), p. 18,

might be- used to describe the particular variety of open
economy that exists in Canada, underdeveloped* backward, and
colonial are but a few of these terms*

However, most of •

these tbrma, are inaccurate and misleading.

It is true that

Canada still exhibits many of the conditions that are com*
monly associated with the colonial type of economy such as
the lack of manpower in the midst of a superabundance of
natural resources, a lack of highly developed heavy industry,
and a population that is dependent upon immigration, but
they do not indicate the true nature of the economy^
Because Canada lacks population, especially as ap
plied to agriculture and mining, there has been a rapid de
velopment of highly mechanised methods of production in
these industries.

These are the very industries that in un

derdeveloped of backward areas are generally carried on in a
rather crude and inefficient manner*

In Canada* on the other

hand, the primary industries such as mining and agriculture
are highly mechanized and form the basis for the growing
production of highly manufactured goods.

Therefore* it is

inconsistent to call Canada underdeveloped or backward.
At present the Canadian economy is in that stage of
its development that is midway between the colonial and in
dustrial economies.

It has moved out of the backward Stage*

but has not yet attained the advanced stage.

This is a
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stage of development that can best be described as an export
economy*

Using this term one can adequately describe the

lack of heavy industry without failing to recognize the
highly developed primary industries which play a part in the
Canadian economy similar to that played by heavy industry in
a more highly industrialized economy, and at the same time
the young and sizeable heavy industry that is developing in
Canada is not ignored by concentrating on just the colonial
aspects*
A further point in favor of calling Canada an export
economy is that Canada, speaking quantitatively, does not
depend upon external sources for the supply of capital that
it needs to develop its industry as does the colonial eco
nomy of a relatively primitive agricultural or raw material
producing nation.

In the past Canada has used her capital

imports to build up manufacturing industry,

that Canada

was successful in this, and is no longer dependent upon
other nations for capital, is demonstrated by the fact that
Canadian imports have shifted from finished manufactured
goods to raw materials and semifinished manufactured
goods,
Stovel points out one of the most basic character

14Ibid,, p. 201.

istics of the Canadian economy when he says that ^Canadian
economic history is the story of a development based upon
one dr a few staple commodities.

For such a development the

motif is inevitably great change and flux#

Any innovation

affeeting the production or demand for these staples will
15
have a profound effect on them*”
The main staples upon
which Canada has built her Foreign trade are newsprint and
wheat*

As McLeod indicates,the supply of these commodities

is relatively inelastic with respect to prices and the de
mand schedule for them tends to shift violently oyer the
business cycle both in Canada and in the nations that regu
larly trade with Canada#16

Thus# Canadian domestic prices

and incomes vary significantly with the level of foreign
trade#

Consequently, the Canadian economy is especially

vulnerable to depressions of external origin#

Wallich in

his theoretical examination ©f the export economy finds that
*fhe most obvious feature of the export economy * . * is
that exports and imports respectively assume the roles that,
in an investment economy like the United States, are played
by investment and savings#*17

The significance of this to

Canada is that exports rather than investment become the

5Ibid.t p* 3#
16McLeod, op* ©it*, p.# 28*
17H* G* Wallich, acne.tarv Problems of an Export Ecoffomy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p* 16.

main generating force in the determination of the Canadian
national income; and consequently, imports not savings constitute the main leakage from the income stream,

ft is this

situation that accounts for the Canadian economy*®. excessive
dependence upon.external'forces*

Economically speaking,the

export economy is at the mercy of its international customera*

it can only react to international fluctuations* it

can not originate thorn*

this seemingly undesirable position

is deceptive because the export economy does have the advan
tage of being freed from the possibility of violent fluctua
tions due to internal circumstances*

However* even this

relative advantage may have an ill effect because* if the
nation is practically incapable of producing major fluctua
tions from internal causes* it is also unable to take the
compensating measures that are available to the investment
economy*

As has been noted* the Canadian economy cannot

shift its productive factors away from depressed export pro
duction to production for the home market.
the fact that the above analysis of the export econo
my describes the Canadian situation is obvious from the ma
terial presented in the Canadian balance sheet and income
statement*

A fact that is less obvious is that this situa

tion of being an export economy forces the Canadian attitude
towards foreign trade to be a liberal one.

For Canada it is

not a question

of

whether to traUe or not* -it is a question

of how best to trade.

Towers confirms this when

he

says .'

«ReeattS» .nf .'0»«waa*s relatively large stafce in foreign busi
ness y o i ’w o u M expect as to he in favor of convertihility of
currencies •unit
tradef”*9

.

t he

removal of restrict ions on international

€I&P$EE II

'tm c m m i M

balascb of imteemtional

PATHSSfS.'
i*

m u m m m

fMOB

the general patters of Canadian foreign trade tip to
World,War II was largely determined in the early years of
the twentieth /century,.' Hucb of this basic pattern has per**
stated in spite of the changes produced by World War II.
Ibis chapter is concerned with presenting the evolution of
the basic pattern that exists at present*
Historically Canada*s foreign trade represents the
'adaptation of a rapidly expanding underdeveloped economy to
a generally favorable pattern of world trade*

As a result

of the conditions at the turn of the century, when railroad
building was opening up the vast frontier of land, forest,
and mineral resources to large scale exploitation, Canadian
emphasis was placed on the production of a limited number of
types of goods that commanded a ready world market.

With

the proceeds of her exports Canada was able to purchase a
wide variety of goods not produced in Canada,

Thus, Canada

became, and still is, a large exporter of specialized pro
ducts.
As previously noted, the Canadian economy is partic

ularly wall adapted to the production of raw materials*
Early Canadian trade was dominated by the fur* fishing* and
mining industries* but with the expansion of Industrialization brought about by the introduction of steam power in
1850 and electric power at the turn of the century* the na
ture of the Canadian stock-in-trade became more diversi
fied,

Canadian export trade finally centered in processing

raw materialsi.' For example, wood was turned into pulp and
paper* ores were smelted and refined* and wheat was milled
into flour*

fable fl shows the value of trade over nearly

three decades in the exports of most importance since the
end of world War 1*
Several writers have asserted that there is a tend
ency toward a greater percentage of manufactured goods in
Canadian exports*1

la a sense they are correct* but one

must realize that by manufactured exports are meant simply
those goods* end products or otherwise* which include a high
Canadian content of labor and capital*

By using this defini

tion the principal products in the Canadian export list can
be considered manufactured* but the fundamental bases of the

1Anthony ¥, G* Koo, "Studies in the Theory of Exchange
Equilibrium,” (unpublished Sectoral dissertation* Harvard
University, Cambridge* 1949), pp, 64-65j G* 5* Watts* "Some
Long-term Factors in the Canadian Balance of International
Payments*" qana^lan dpui;q,%l M iconomlcs
Political *
Science, XVI (February, 1950)7 17.

w m M m
(Kiliioas of Canadian Dollars)

Goameiity

1920

1930

i960

10?

1951

Hewsprini
w&m%
WOodputlp
IiUmDer
Nickel

5k
%U$
41
75
9

133

131
120
61
68

jm

■ 265
177
203

536
661
365

21

'61

60

33
30
26
40

55
-82

126
117 ■

If?

114
8?
72

Altaainum
m m

Wheat flour
Copper
Meats
AutOfBoMles M i pai‘ta

m

w
37

6

8

41
9k

30
38

1

1
. 8
.
20

.

$6
18

63
0 -

Source? Canadian OoverBBient, Depurtsseat
L»*t ifsffliiwi
lefereace Papers, Ho.
', p. 2; «pa €

65
103
93

i looks

312

137

63

31

Canadian export trad® are still the natural resources of the
country* hot the industrial plant.

In fact, one of the most

striking characteristics of the products in the Canadian ex
port trade is that they are virtually all the products of
fixed and specialised resources.

This fact in addition to

the limited domestic consumption of the principal export
goods makes the supply of these goods relatively inelastic*
The supply cannot be altered from year to year to meet the
vagaries of the foreign market without a serious disloca
tion in the industry or region involved, since adaptation is
difficult or impossible in the short run.
tforld markets for staple commodities tend to be high
ly competitive and extremely sensitive to supply so that
variations in price by any one producer causes an even
greater variation in that producer*# demand curve*

There

fore, since for the most part the principal Canadian exports
are of the type for which there is a large world market, the
demand tends to be relatively elastic*
The Canadian concentration in a few important pro
ducts means that Canada does not produce or produces only in
limited quantity a large variety of other products which she
needs.

Certain commodities* such as rubber, tea, and cotton,

are not produced because the climate of Canada is not suita
ble to their production; others like wool, silk, china, and

W
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w

.41
50

48
71

127
249

U ■
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31
37
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• 106
dO
*39

168

21
23
lit
19
28
29
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120
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44
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88

20
KaeMaery, ereeft farm
F&ra Impleaenis and'
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do

Electrical
Cotton, raw
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u

Ceiton goods
Fruite
Sugar and produsts

4f
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?4
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goods, especially capital and durable consumers goods (see
fable T O ) ,

the demand for this type of goods As especially

sensitive to price changes since there is the tendency (as
long as the goods are not of vital importance) to postpone
purchases if there is a rise in price, and a tendency to
anticipate needs whoa prices are low*

the Canadian demand

for imports is also relatively elastic in relation to the
level of domestic income*

fhe volume o f ,purchases of im

ported durable consumers goods and highly manufactured
goods for domestic consumption varies directly with the lev*
el of income in Canada*

When dealing with the vast variety

of goods that Canada imports* it is difficult to generalize
and make a clear statement of the elasticity of demand, but
since the preponderance of imports (by value) are in the
highly or semimanufactured class, the demand will tend to
be more elastic than inelastic*

the foreign supply of €a*

nadiao imports is generally elastic,since in most cases the
supply of highly manufactured goods is highly elastic*
However* since not all of the goods imported into Canada are
in the highly manufactured class, the supply is of mixed
elasticity*

Saw material

imports, similar to the Canadian

supply of this class of goods, tend
elastic*

to be relatively in*

36
II.

THE PATTERS OP CANADIAN TRADE

The direction of pattern of Canadian foreign trade
can be divided into three historic periods! pre-World war X*
the inter-war period* and post-'tforld War II*

Each of these

periods will be treated separately in order to show the evo
lution of the Canadian trade pattern and the origin of the
postwar trade problems which are of vital importance in un
derstanding Canadian exchange problems and policies.
Pre-forld war £ period.

The Canadian trade pattern

in the pre-World War I period was the result of the general
world trade pattern that dominated the period.

The princi

pal portion of the goods in international trade flowed into
Europe from the rest of the world,

There was an equalizing

flow of capital and services from Europe to the rest of the
world*

Great Britain was‘at the center of European trade

matters; and therefore, as Canada came to maturity

she was

oriented to Europe, and particularly, to Great Britain,2
This trade connection with Great Britain was beneficial to

^«The pattern of world trade in the years preceding
world »ar I was probably of greater significance than the
natural resources of the country in determining the degree
to which different Canadian industries developed and the ex
tent to which Canada became dependent on world trade for its
livelihood,'' Canadian Government, Department of External Af
fairs, Canada*s Foreign Trade. Reference Papers, No* 30
(Ottawa! liepariraent of External Affairs, August, 1943), p. 3.
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Canada, because Britain provided capital to develop the Ca
nadian economy and, in addition, provided a ready market for
the disposal of the growing volume of Canadian production of
basic materials*

Britain also provided a large share of Ca

nada’s merchandise imports*

However, for the most part, Ca-

nada depended upon the United State® as the supplier of the
goods she did not produce,**

It is the Canadian orientation

toward European countries that resulted in markets for her
exports and furnished her with capital, and the dependence
upon the United States for imports that gave the pre-3forld
isFar I pattern of Canadian trade its triangular appearance.
In the working of the Canadian-British-American trade
triangle Canada used the large positive balance of sterling
that resulted from the heavy export trade with Britain and
other sterling nations to cover the equally large net nega
tive balance of dollars that resulted from the import trade
with the United States,

On the other hand, the United

States used her net positive balance of Canadian dollars
to settle the net negative balance of sterling that resulted
from the large interest and dividend payments on British in
vestment in the United States*

Finally, Britain completed

*1* , , , the Canadian way of life gives rise to a
special propensity to consume Americas products**’ C* D,
Blyth, ttSome Aspects of Canada’s International Financial
Relations,** Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science* XII (August, I 9 ^ > , 306,

the triangle by using surplus American dollars to cover the
net negative balance with Canada* the consequence of the
large British imports of Canadian primary products*4
C. S* Watts has pointed out what is probably the most
important aspect of the triangle from the Canadian point Of
view*

He says:

Historically the central feature of our balance of
payments has been our dependence on developing suffi*
cient export balances with overseas countries to settle
our chronic large current deficit with the United
States**the given factor in the situation* When esr*
porting overseas we have tended to be more concerned
with exporting for dollars than in disposing of export
surplusesf and least of all concerned with taking pay*
moot in goods and services from this area* In other
words* in the first instance at least, overseas trade
has been regarded more_as a financial cperaiieu than
the exchange of goods*9
It appears, then* that the main reason for Canadian partici
pation In the triangle is that Canada buys more from the
United States than she sells there with the result that she
must sell more to other countries and use the proceeds to

% e cannot draw the presentation of the tripartite
relations too strictly* because* as Angus points out*, “The
concept of the triangle is itself open to challenge* the
three countries are not quite so complementary nor is the
triangle so selfcontained as is at times suggested* It is
not by exports, visible or invisible, to the Baited States
that Britain acquires the US dollars with which Canadians
must in part be paid* but by exports to third countries*"
H* FV Angus, nA Review of *Borth Atlantic Triangle, the In
terplay of Canada* the United States* and Great Britain* by
J* Bartlet Irebaer**
&litlqal. Science. XII ( M t f 1046), 220* <•
hG* S« Matts*
«Some Long-Term Factors in theCanadian
Balance of Interaational Pavmen ts t" Canadian Journal 6f Eco
nomics and Political Science* XVl (February, 1050), 17*

settle the deficit on current account with the United States*
Free convertibility of currencies is the one condi
tion absolutely essential to the efficient working of the
triangular pattern of trade*

Each nation must be able to

convert freely the proceeds of its exports into the curren
cies that it needs to settle its balance of payments;

The

rate of exchange also plays an important role in the con
vertibility of currencies and the working of the trade tri
angle*

In order for the triangle to work, the conversions

of currency must be made at rather stable rates with a min
imum of loss.
In the pre-3forld War I triangular trade pattern un
der the international gold standard* Grumb says that "While
rates varied in response to changes in the terms of trade,
fluctuations were held within close range of the purchasing-power-parity of dollars and pounds by their effect on
the availability of export bills in the exchange market*”®
The inter-war period*

In the inter-war period the

pattern of Canadian trade was changed* but still retained
its principal triangular characteristics*

One of the most

6<J» A. Crumb, "Some Prospects for Free Convertibili
ty,” Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Pacific Northwest
Conference On Backing^(Seaitiei slatel&oiieTge^
,
ifeS^j pi i?* •'

important changes that took place during this period was the
emergence-of the United States as a creditor nation,

The

United States-* achievement of the position of a creditor na
tion meant, in effect, that American industry was able to
produce a large enough surplus on trade account to cover the
net negative balance on capital account and add to the na
tional holdings of foreign exchange#

At the same time that

the United States was becoming a creditor nation, Great
Britain was losing its standing as a creditor,

ituch of the

large British investment in the United States that had been
the basis of the prewar favorable balance on capital account
with the United States had been liquidated during the war#'
These changes in the balance ,of payments of the nations in
the triangle called for a readjustment in the pattern of
trade;

Because of her creditor standing it became increas

ingly necessary for the tfciited States to take imports in
kind for the dividends and interest earned on her large for
eign investment#

On the other hand, it became necessary for

Britain to bring her visible trade into equality, now that
the rate of foreign lending and income

from previous for

eign investments had fallen off and could no longer support
an unfavorable balance on current account#

Canada stood in

the middle of these changes#
*

As a result of the wartime expansion program Canada*s

industrial plant was more capable than ever of carrying on a
large export trade with Great Britain and other overseas
areas in order to' secure funds to make ef f ec tive the heavy
Canadian demand for American imports resulting from the
postponed- wartime expeaditures.
One of the main obstacles that Canada and the rest of
the world encountered in the attempt to readjust their trade
patterns to the new world situation was the strong protec*
tionisf movement of the inter-war period,

Kany of the na

tions of the world experienced extreme difficulty in trying
to balance their payments immediately after the war and
'during'-'the depression that followed* _ Tariffs and other
trade barriers were popular devices which were used to com
bat these difficulties,

these

difficulties interrupted the

free flow of goods and services and eliminated the basis of
multilateral trade*.
Another serious obstacle to the readjustiaeat of
trade generally| and the reestablishment of the Canadian
trade ■triangle in particular, was the growing use of ex
change controls:*■■As noted previously* the working of the
trade triangle is dependent upon the free convertibiii ty of
currency at reasonably stable rates*

In the inter-war pe

riod many national including those in the triangle* found
themselves in serious domestic financial difficulties that
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forced them to abandon the gold standard*

With the passing

of the gold standard, exchange rates became unstable and
subject to violent fluctuations which made international
trade a very risky business*

Both protectionism and unsta

ble exchange rates struck heavily at the Canadian attempt to
readjust her trade,
Two possible solutions to the post-World War I prob
lems of Canada were: (1) increasing exports to overseas and
areas and thereby securing the funds to balance the current
deficit with the United States, and

increasing her ex

ports to the United States to remove the deficit,

However,

conditions were such that neither of these solutions could
be applied,

Britain and the overseas area could not accept

more Canadian exports because of their inability to finance
an unbalanced current account,

The American protectionist

policy of the inter-war period excluded the possibility of
increased exports to the United States, and consequently,
the characteristic bilateral disequilibrium of the Canadian
balance of payments was intensified.

During the period

1920-32 Canada found a temporary remedy and was able to
achieve a balance in her International payments by off
setting the current deficit with the Onited States by capi
tal imports of American dollars plus current surpluses with
countries other than Great Britain*

When the depression

began in 1930, the; capital imports from the United States
ceased and Canada, was forced to gear her economic activity
to a low level of employment and income because of the loss
of international ■•trade-#
The post-Mori d liar II period*

the second World War

with its immense American and overseas demand for Canadian
products postponed the final solution of the bilateral im
balance of the Canadian balance of payments*

Curing the war

Canadian industries were greatly expanded and the basic pat**
tern of production was somewhat modified*
/

Before the war

■■

Canadian manufacturing had been mainly concentrated in the
primary processing of goods for export and the final proc
essing of consumer goods for domestic consumption.

A great

part of the Canadian wartime and postwar investment was
used to acquire facilities in the field of intermediate
processing*

fhe Canadian manufacturing industries have

thereby become better adapted to processing goods from raw
materials to finished productsj a development already evi-

^Stovel, speaking of the cessation of the capital in
flow from the United States and the heavy Canadian imports
from the United States, says, B?he construction of current
receipts at the end of the decade of the twenties * . . was
a shock at odds with the basic requirements of the economy,
the absorption of which involved large scale underemploy
ment and unemployment of capital and labor,» $. A* Stovel,
aCanadian Balance of Payments,*5 (Unpublished Sectoral Slssertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1949), p* 233*
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deuced by the marked increase in the variety of goods pro
duced in Canada*

A further result of this development is

reflected in the increase in the finished manufactured content of Canadian exports to overseas areas*

For instance*

Wafts points out that:

In normal times during the last generation goods so
defined Cfully manufactured] comprised about one-fifth
of our total exports* In the overseas countries which
received the bulk of these exports the proportion was
much greater* about 30 %, More recently it has been
much higher owing to the abnormal postwar requirements
and pressure on facilities elsewhere,8
However* this increase in the overseas export of
Canadian fully manufactured goods does not offer a solution
for the disequilibrium in the Canadian trade pattern.

On .

the contrary* it might even intensify the problem* because*
as Blyth observes* wXt should be recognized that high ex
ports, particularly escorts of manufactured goods, lead to
larger direct imports from the tMited States because of
their substantial dollar content**9
Another effect of the second World War was the in
tensification of the American creditor position and the vir
tual elimination of Britain and Western Sarppe as world
creditors*

Western luropean nations and Great Britain were

put under a heavy pressure to bring their commodity exports

8Watts, foe, cf.it*

%lyth* op. cit. , p* 310*
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and imports into closer balance as a result of their loss of
creditor standing* a situation similar to the one this area
experienced after the first World war* only more serious
this time*

the task of bringing exports and imports into

balance means that exports from Great Britain and Western
Europe must in the future be larger relative to imports than
they were in the past.

It is imperative that the absolute

level of the foreign trade of Western European countries
exceed prewar levels

if the prewar level

of standard of

living is to be regained, or exceeded, and the burden of in
creased national debts offset*

At the same time the United

States and Canada have increased their industrial potential
greatly, and consequently, their ability to export has gone
up*

If both groups of countries have to increase their ex

ports in order to maintain their standard of living and
prosperity, then collectively they will have to increase
their imports*

For Canada the postwar situation is such
i

that in the relative, if not in the absolute sense, Western
Europe has become a less favorable area for her to market
her exports, but a more favorable area to obtain imports*
As a result, Canada must bring her trade with the non-Euro
pean market into better balance, which in the last analysis,
means she must bring trade with the United States closer to
to equality*

?he financial difficulty Canada experienced
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in attempting to carry out this adjustment will be reviewed
in Chapter IV*
In the postwar period the concept of the triangle has
completely changed} the arrangement of the participating
nations has been reversed*

The United States now occupies

the position of the mature creditor nation similar to the
position of Great Britain before World War I*

Britain has

been reduced to the standing similar to that of the United
States in the pre*frorld War I period*

This position is one

which Crumb describes as follows:
The United Kingdom has reverted to the status of a
country which must have an excess of merchandise and
service to cover, for the time being at least, the is*
ports of capital necessary to complete the modernization
of her industrial plant and possibly to make up a net
deficit on investment income account,
Canada#s position in the postwar period is similar to the
American position following World War I.

Canadian industry

is now able to produce a surplus on trade balance and pay off
accumulated debt on investment account.

Canada is rapidly

approaching the status of a creditor nation*
At least three problems face Canada in the postwar
international trade.

First, the pattern of trade that pre

vailed in the years before <orld War I and persisted on an
unstable footing during the inter-war period has been re-

10Crumb, oj>. cit., p, 18,
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lop the principal Canadian industries which required a large
investment of capital in relation to labor*

In more recent

times the importance of foreign capital has declined, the,
net Canadian indebtedness being $ 6,000,000,000 in 1950 as
compared with $• 4,100,000,GOO in 1950*11

According to the

Canada fear Book the function of foreign capital in the Ca
nadian economy at present is a relatively minor one*

The

Year Book contends that*
Canadian capital has been the principal source of
Canadian development in the past twenty years or more*
Investment, which was subnormal during the 1930*s,
showed notable expansion in certain fields during World
War II and rose to peak levels in post-war years* Even
in 1956 and 1951, when capital inflows were very sub**
stantial, the portion of investment financed fey non
resident capital was minor* In those years the net
contrifeutlon fey nonresidents and foreign controlled
companies to the savings used for all types of invest
ment in Canada was only about one-seventh of the tolai.12
Beside the changes in the absolute amount and rela
tive importance of foreign investment in Canada there have
also been significant changes in the origin and composition
of the investment*

the relative importance of British and

American investment In Canada has changed greatly in recent

^ffewever, 1950 represents a year of rapid capital
inflow* The low point in the Canadian negative balance of
indebtedness was 1949, when the total was $ 3,730,000,000.
Canada Year Book* 1952—53* p* 10S6.
'

p-
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decades (see fable IX),

In the pre-World War I period Brit** ,

ish investment constituted the largest portion of external
capital invested in Canada,

However, during and after World

War I American investment in Canada increased rapidly and in
1926, just before the decrease of the total foreign invest
ment in Canada during the 1930%, the American investment in
Canada was $ 3,196,000,000 as compared with the British in**
vestment of $ 2,636,000,000,

During World War II American

investment reached a record peak, but during the same peri**
od British investment decreased as a result of the Canadian
reparation of securities*

Consequently, the total amount

of foreign capital invested in Canada did not increase
during World War II.
Substantial increases in American investment ip Ca
nada occurred during the postwar period*

the largest of

these increases took place in the years following 1948, par**
ticularly in 1950 and 1951*

fhe increase in American in

vestment from 1946 to 1951 amounted to about $ 2,250,000,000.
Throughout the period reinvestment of earnings accounted for
more than one half of the increase*

The greatest actual in

flow of capital occurred during 1950-51*
been advanced for this inflow*

Two reasons have

One, according to

Jr., ¥,

popkin, is that the strong Canadian dollar position in 1952
* * . * reflects our current attraction for foreign capital

m m it
m m t m sapi§ai, iffssfis -nr ganada,
i f vma o r iintes*§«sa& ■
(Millions of Canadian Dellars)

fype.of Investment
Government securities
federal
Provincial'
Municipal

1933

1939

1946

1948

751.9
571*7
394.4

823.0
536.0

750.0
594.0

823.0

344.0

267.0

1949

1950

528.0
248*0

975.0 1,141,0
565.0
534.0
246.0
256.0

fotal Government
■securities

lf? l M

1.703.0 1,611,0 1,599.0

1.755*0 1 ,962.0

Public utilities
Bailways
Others

2,224.7 1,870.8 1,583.0 1,504.0
557,0
468,0
625.4
54f.4

1,445.0 1 ,456*0
494.0
543.0

fotal public utilities

2,870.1 2,420.0 2,140.0 1,972.0 1,939*0 1,999.0

Manufacturing
■lining and smelting
Merchandising
Financial iastitatioas
■Other enterprises''
Wioeelianeous assets

1,421.6 1,445.2 1,895.0 2 ,317.0 2,539.0 2,763*0
386.0
628.0
424.0
494.0
338.5 .. 329.1
238.0
279.0
262 .0
191.5
I8 9.3
310.0
557.0
541.0
548.0
566.0
4?9*6
472.7
69.0
83.0
98.0
75.2
69.0
78.0
32
0.0
270 .O
285.0
282.0
298.0
302.0

fotal foreign ‘
investments'

7,364.5 6*913*3 7 ,178 .0 .7,491.0

British*
United States1
**
Other countries

2,682.8 2,475,9 1,668,0 1.593.0 1.694.0 1 ,723*0
4,491.7 4,151.4 5.157.0 5.566.0 5.905.0 6,565.0
190.0
286.0
353.0
340.0
332.0
358.0

.

7,939.0 8,646,0

•includes some investments held in the U.K. for residente of other
countries.
** Includes some lavestments held la the U.S. for residents of other
eeuntries.
Seurse: Canada Year look:

p. IO89.
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because of our attractive opportunities for investment* a
conservative fiscal policy* and favorable tax policies**13
A more plausible explanation is offered by W, C. Clark* who
says that?
During the spring and summer of 1950* as our econom
ic situation improved* a large and increasing number of
people* both inside and outside of Canada, came to the
conclusion that the Canadian dollar was undervalued at
the chosen official rates and, therefore* on top of a
large inflow of investment capital interested in the
development of our oil and other natural resources* we
had an avalanche of speculative capital lured by the
almost *sure bet* of an upward revaluation of our del*

lar*P

.

These reasons are cited in order to distinguish the 1950-51
inflow of capital from the inflow of American capital that
took place in 1920*s.

the principal difference between the

two is that the 1920 movement fa large part of which was
short term) was induced balance of payments borrowing which
is an indication of an underlying disequilibrium in the
balance of payments,

The 1950-51 movement was more in the

nature of an autonomous movement of speculative and long
term investment funds, which were not connected with a fun
damental disequilibrium in the balance of payments*

This

V j . W, Popkin, “Canada and Cur Cold Buying Policy,*
Commercial and Financial Chronicle* CIXXVII (January,15.
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'•1% . C» -Cl ark. Canada^s Past~#ar Finance, Statements
and Speeches so, 52/59,'(Wtawa: Department of External
Affairs* December 29* 1952)* p. 13.
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distinction will be of considerable importance in the later
evaluation of Canada1s postwar exchange difficulties and the
methods used to overcome them#
Canada*$ foreign assets#

the amount and composition

of Canada *5 foreign assets has changed greatly in recent
years (see fable X).

In the period from 1930 to 1950 the

total value of Canadians foreign assets* including gold and
liquid reserves in foreign currency* rose from $ 1*867*000*000
to $ 5*454>000,000#

The greatest part of this increase was

the result of the Federal Government's extension of loans
and export credits to the United Kingdom and other overseas
countries,*15

At present the largest portion of Canadian

foreign assets are officially owned.

Since the end of World

War II privately owned foreign assets have constituted only
a minor portion of the total Canadian holdings of foreign
assets*

The total privately owned portfolio investment

abroad has declined since 1939 due to the liquidation of the
Canadian holdings of American securities (see Table XI ).16

15The reasons for these loans and their effect on the
Canadian balance of payments are discussed in Chapter I?. .
16Blyth contends that! "The financial effect of the
war years has been a sharp increase in American investment
in Canada and a decrease in Canadian long-term investment in
the United States accompanied by a substantial increase In
Gan&da*s liquid assets in the United States*" filyth* op.
eit*. p* 304.

f&MM

X

CHANGES IS flX GOMPOSItlOS GP GAN&BIAN
FOREIGN INVESfMISfS, 19% X ® 1950
(Milliene of Canadian Boliar8 )

location of
Investments

Baited States

Bireet
Portfolio Investments
Investments Stocks
Bonds
fetal
19% 1950 19% 1950 19% 1950 19% 1950

m

760

260 298

fatal
Investments
1950
19%

83

91

343

389

829

1 ,1%

Bai ted Kingdom

do

64

2-5

19

26

18

51

37

111

101

Other Commonwealth
countries

64

86

7

6

11

8

IS

14

82

100

162

80

106

125

33

33

139 158

301

238

153 150

551 59®

Other foreign
Countries
fotal

m

990

398 448

1,323 1,588

HGfS; Excludes investments of insurance companies, Government credits,
and liquid reserves. Holdings of stocks are at Book -mines as shown on the
hooks of the issuing company; holdings of hands are shown at par value* for
eign currency is converted into Canadian dollars at current market rate.
. Souree: Canada fear Book: 19%-%, p. 11#; and Canada fear Book:
p, 1091.
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TABLE XI
CANADIAN FOREIGN ASSSTS
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

1930

1939

1946

1948

1949

1950

Direct investment in
business outside Canada

443

671

772

788

904

990

Portfolio holdings of
foreign securities

842

719

551

605

638

598

31

31

1.362

1,8?8

2,000

1.990

m

1,251

1,006

1,232

1,876

1,8?6

3,936

4,277

4,774

5.454

Assets

Government credits
Official balances of
gold held abroad
Total Canadian assets
abroad

180

1,496

MOTE: Excludes investment of insurance companies*
Source; Canada Year Book; 1950. p. 394; and Canada Year Book:
1952*51. a. 1090.
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Canada*s ability to export capital.

Canada*s claim

to the title of creditor nation is not a clear one.

Canada

is stiil a debtor nation in the sense that there is more
foreign capital in Canada ($ 8,646,900,000 in 1950) than
Canadians have invested abroad ($ 5 *4 5 4 ,0 0 0 ,000 ).

However,

Canada is a creditor nation in the sense that in every year
since 1934 Canada has had a net credit in her favor on the
balance of International payments*

the deciding question

in estimating Caaada*s international financial position is
the

nation*# ability to export capital. Blytfe expresses

one

opinion on the matter.

He contends thati%

. , *"it will not be long before Canada is in fact
a creditor nation in so far as its financial relations
with the overseas world at large is concerned, the
existence, however, of a sobstantial balance of indebt
edness to the United States will, for a long time at
least, more than offset Canada1# creditor position with
the rest of the world* 17
Another view is that the great increase in officially owned
forjeign assets constitotes evidence that * , . * Canada will
be able to continue the prewar pattern of reducing her in**
ternational indebtedness and undertaking some new investment
abroad*a*18

the Volume of evidence, however, seems to indi-*

l% > l d *» p* 395*
^Canadian Government, Departmentof External Affairs,
Canada1# Foreign trade. Reference Papers, No. 30 (Ottawa!
department of External Affairs, August, 1943), p. 9,
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cate a compromise as being correct.

Clark’s contention is

the basis of this opinion, he says:
Since the end of the war, if we take into account
what we have lent or invested abroad, we have provided
enough out of our own savings to finance the whole of
our development program. It is true that in 1950 and
1951 Canadian savings equaled only 90 % of the total,
but for the period 1946 to 1951 we have a net investment
abroad of $ 78 million and that the net result is not
likely to have been effected very much either way by
developments during 1952.19
Therefore, the Canadian economy is capable of supplying it
self with all the necessary funds to carry on an extremely
large scale program of internal development, and is in a
sense self-supplied with respect to capital.

This type of

self-sufficiency with respect to capital is quite different,
however, from a net creditor position.

That Canada is not a

mature creditor nation, such as the United States is or
Great Britain was, is indicated by the fact that Canada
could not maintain her official program of export credits
and loans to overseas nations, at the same time that she was
experiencing an internal expansion, without an inflow of
funds from the United S t a t e s T o

sum up, the Canadian

19 Clark, op. cit., p. 4,

20f,The greater portion of the funds for development
are being provided internally, but the present rate would be
impossible of attainment were it not for the Influx of funds
from the United States." H. A. Stevenson, "Canada’s Out
standing Industrial Development.8 Commercial and Financial
Chronicle. CLXXIV (December 13, 1951>, 2271.
—
«

•eeenoiay^^aiibnogb capable ol, ps*oM^iat sufficieat capital
far

:;

(aao a high rate of employ*

meat).*. :la:|#;Mll::aot capable- of e^ortlog capital in large
a^nnta'iffitfeoat ;obiapeiisatlii^ inflowsof .foreign capital.
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FOREIGN EXCHANGE THEORY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the fraise*
work of the theory of exchange rate determination within
which the particular Canadian exchange problems can be ex
plored.
The task of constructing such a theoretical frame
work is complicated by the fact that there are numerous and
diverse theories of exchange rate determination.

This com

plication dates from the general abadonment of the inter
national gold standard during the 1 9 3 0 %

and is rooted in

the resultant controversy over fixed versus variable ex#
change rates.

Economists have advanced a welter of theo

ries either defending or attacking the ideas of fixed or
variable exchanges*, but in more recent times the controversy
has been settled* as Young contends* in favor of fixed rates
with infrequent adjustment,1

At present it seems that ex

change rates* whether directly controlled or not, have be
come a matter of official decision, rather than the result
of the operation of free market forces4

This settling of

the controversy does not, however, solve the problem of

^dohn Parke Young* ^Exchange Rate Determination,H
American Economic Review* XXXVII (September* 1947), 589*
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constructing a framework of exchange rate theory.^

fhe ob

ject of this chapter is to present the forces at work in the
determination of an equilibrium rate of exchange under any
condition, controlled or not.

Under a system of exchange

control, or one of the numerous other devices used to fix
the rate, equilibrium can be forced at almost any rate of
exchange, but even under these conditions the rate must
reflect the market demand and supply of foreign exchange as
they finally appear to the buyers and sellers in the market*
It is for this reason that we must first apply ourselves to
presenting the fundamental market forces in exchange rate
determination before we are able to go on and examine the
situation in the controlled or restricted exchange market.
Just as in value theory, where one constructs a model of
perfect competition before considering imperfect competition
and monopoly conditions, so in the case of exchange rate
theory it is best to analyse the free market before ap
proaching the controlled market.

^Despite the settling of the question of fixed versus
variable rates, the controversy between the purchasingpower-parity anti the balance of payments approach.
to the
determination of exchange rate rages unchecked. The latter
approach is used as the basis of the exchange rate theory
presented here.

I. ;fim G M E R A L THEORY Of FQREIGH EXGHARGB
The rate of foreign exchange is in reality a- price,
Since the rate is nothing wore than an expression of the’
vaiwe of n particular national isonetary aaif in terms of the
monetary

another country t -or in'other words*-it is

the price of one monetary unit in terms of another*

When

the ■rate-.,of exchange is viewed as a price, the problem of '
constructing a theory of 'exchanges is simplified; and’re*'
solved into an exercise of applying the -analytical tools
developed in modern value and price theory*

Harsh contends

that tfffee peeuiarities of the foreign exchange market are
institutional and a separate theory of foreign exchanges
is redundant and futile* ,t3
to analysing exchange rate determination, it is aec*
essary to realise that the establishing of an equilibrium
rate of exchange under free market conditions is-# la reality,
only a part of the larger movement of the balance of pay
ments toward equilibrium and the adjustment of the domestic
economy to external conditions*

Harsh says that:

the balancing effect of transactions in the foreign
exchange market is * * * a part of a larger'-process,

■%0iiald Bailey/Harsh, World■Trade and Investment (lew
York: Hareourt, Brace and Company,!§51), p* 176.
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the allocation of resources among alternative uses* And
at the,same time, if the level of activity is not given
{as indeed it never is given in the real world), the
foreign exchange market impinges also on the expansion
(or contraction) effect of the trade balance upon the
level of exports and imports, home consumption, invest*
ment, national income, and the volume of employment,4
It is apparent, therefore, that an analysis of foreign ex
change determination is.an integral part of the theory of
international trade*
fhe determination of the exchange rate is inextricab
ly boundi up with equilibrating of the balance of interna
tional payments, which is an accounting of the exchanges
made between one country and the rest of the world*

One of

the basic factors in the balance of payments is the unit of
account {national currency) in terms of which the balance is
expressed*

Consequently, if the balance of payments is to

be in equilibrium, the unit of account must also be in
equilibrium*

A balance of payments equilibrium for the

world as a whole presupposes the stability of the various
monetary units in terms of each other*

$o, as JEarsh points

out, * * * « the process of achieving equilibrium is in
part an adjustment of the values of these monetary units*”**
It is most convenient to distinguish only two major
subdivisions in the balance of payments! (1 ) the balance of

4Ibid*;* p. 191;*

5Ibid** pp* 174-76*
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trade which represents the income account and deals with
payments in connection with exports and imports* and (2 ) the
balance of lending which represents the capital account and
deals with the payments in connection with short* and long*
term borrowing and lending*

Since for any given period the

balance of payments as a whole must balance* it follows that
payments in respect to the balance of lending must be equal
and opposite to payments in respect to the balance of trade*
All balance of payments items on one side of the account are
immediately offset by items on the other side of the balance.
This is merely the international counterpart of the account
used in recording foreign transactions in the computation of
the national product and national income*
Joan Robinson* in her explanation of the equating of
the balance of payments accounts* points out that it merely
means that when over any period of time a nation has a sur*
plus of receipts from exports over payments for imports it
must* at the same time* be lending (in the broad sense) an
equal sum to the foreign country*6

Similarly, in the case

of a surplus of imports* there must be an equal amount of
borrowing*

However* the mere fact that there must be an

6Joan Robinson, ®The Foreign Exchanges** Readings in
the Theory of International Trade * Series of Republished
Articles on Economics* American Economic Association (Phil
adelphia: The Blakiston Press* 1949)* pp. 65*86*

equality does not explain by what process it is brought
about.
The determinants of the level of the balance of trade
(the volume Of exports and imports) are numerous and com*
pi ex.

Tastes, techniques, the resources of the nations of

the world, and costs and incomes at home and abroad are the
mos t impor tan t'imaedia to de termiaaats.

Cos ts and inc omes ,

however, are in turn dependent upon the level of money
wages, and effective demand.

In the case of the balance of

lending the principal determinants (given wealth and in*
comes) are the relative rates of interest at home and
abroad, and all the numerous factors that can be called
"the state of confidence".

These diverse forces only deter

mine what the balance of lending and the balance of trade
are to b e ; equality between the two accounts is brought
about through the operation of supply and demand, as ex
pressed in the exchange rate,

Pollowing a similar line of

reasoning Robinson comes to the conclusion that; "The theo*
ry of exchanges may be regarded as the analysis of the man*
ner in which movements of the balance of lending and balance
of trade are equated to each other*®7

In mahing this point

Robinson is. admittedly expanding upon the suggestion made by

7Robinson, Ibid., p. 87,
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Keynes in his Treatise on Honey.

It is Keynes' fundamental

proposition that equilibrium in an international currency
requires that each country have an equality between its rate
of foreign lending and its balance of trade.

Keynes elabo

rates on this and states the central part of his thesis in
the contention that: MHow this involves two sets of condi
tions.

For the rate of foreign leading depends upon rela

tive interest rates at home and abroad: whilst the foreign
balance depends upon relative price levels at home and
abroad,”8

These factors which Keynes stated and Robinson

elaborated upon are nothing more than the institutional
factors which Marsh alluded to as being peculiar to the
problem of exchange rate theory,®
Having shown the subsidiary character of the exchange
rate in connection with the balance of payments, the next
step is to examine the actual determination of the exchange
rate.

This is accomplished by describing the exchange mar

ket, the transactions that take place in the market, the
parties to the transaction, the composition of supply and
demand, and finally, the determinants both general (insti
tutional) and specific of the supply and demand for foreign

8John Maynard Keynes, 4 Treatise on Money (Hew York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930”$", Vol. I, p. 327.
9See p. 60.
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exchange.
In essence, the market is a series of transactions in
which commodities are bought and sold at prices which under
the conditions of the market are acceptable to buyers and
sellers.

To be more specific, the foreign exchange market

is a series of transactions in which an exchange of monetary
units is made*

¥hat is actually taking place is the trans

fer of the purchasing power which the monetary unit repre
sents, but just as the abstract concept of purchasing power
must be made more specific by reference to the standard
unit of account, likewise must the abstract concept of the
unit of account be solidified into a more concrete form.
Consequently, although the transactions in the national and
international exchange markets really represent transfers
of purchasing power in the forms of abstract units of account,
the more conventional forms of concrete "means of payments”
are used in order that human beings may observe and manipu
late the proceedings,
Tt seems best; following Machiup*s example, for the
sake of simplicity to combine the spot and forward exchange
markets with the foreign exchange market at a domestic place
and the foreign exchange market at a foreign place into one
perfect market.*0

The advantage of this simplification is

*°Fritz Mac hi up, "The Theory of Foreign Exchanges," Read-
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that, when speaking of one market, it is possible to treat
one currency as the “commodity” and the other currency as
money*
One of the main prerequisites for
buyers and sellers*

any market are

In the case of the foreign exchange

market the buyers and sellers are private persons, profes
sional traders, and the government*

These groups constitute

the parties to the transactions in the exchange market.

De-

manders of foreign currency may be further divided into four
main groups: (1) dealers who wish to pay for goods purchased
from foreigners, (2) financiers who make loans or purchase
foreign securities, (3) speculators who try to profit from
fluctuations in the exchange rates, and (4) those who trans
fer funds from a country of less to one of greater economic
and financial stability.

11

A nation’s actual supply of foreign exchange is made
up of its holdings of the transfer medium in which the ex
change market deals*

Holdings of foreign exchange are al-

iMS. 4a 3Jl« p l f M Z g£> teforna,tl.qna.l, & & & , Series of SepublishedArtides on Economics, American Economic Association
(Philadelphia: The Blakiston Press, 1949), p. 105.
■^A fifth group could be cited representing the offi
cial dealings of the government when it is interested in
establishing a certain rate of exchange, but since the pur
pose here is to describe the determination of the rate in
the absence of governmental interference, we shall disregard
the last classification.

ways holdings of short-term evidences of debt against a
foreign coon try or its residents*

Actiiai carrenoy and

foreign bank balances are the most liquid forms and* there1*
fore, make tip the primary source of supply.

There Is* how*

ever* a secondary reserve of prime liquidity, viz* the
stocks of monetary gold held by the nation in depositories
at home and abroad*

Short-term obligations in foreign ex

change at call or with maturities ranging from thirty to.
ninety days make up a less liquid reserve supply of ex*
change*

There is also a contingent reserve made up of the

holdings of long-term foreign securities and such assets as
real property that may in time of need be converted*
In computing the actual demand for foreign exchange
a nation must take into account the reserves of its home
currency held by other nations.*

the balance of these re

serves may be favorable or unfavorable, that is either a net
asset or a net liability depending upon the relative size
of claims by foreigners on the country in question*

The

balance that la struck between the two reserves is called
the balance of international indebtedness*

This balance is

further broken down into short- and long-ter® categories
based on the degree of liquidity of the claims*

.Within this

subdivision it is possible for a nation to be a net creditor
on long-term and at the same time a debtor on short-term*
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Such a condition might ho necessary to balance a large cur
rent deficit on trade account*

In fact, one of the princi

pal determinants of the balance of indebtedness is ’the bal
ance of trade*

In the yearly accounting of the national in

come the net gain or loss in the trade of goods and services
is posted to the balance of international indebtedness*

In

other words, the day to day changes in the balance of pay
ments on income account are the main source of change in the
balance of indebtedness.
Although of considerable importance, the effect of
the balance of indebtedness on the exchange rate is not nec
essarily direct*

It is possible for the balance, of indebt

edness to be running against a country, and yet there would
not be any pressure on the external value of the nation’s
currency*

However, we can not discount the important fact

that the balance of indebtedness constitutes a contingent or
delayed demand on a nation’s exchange resources which, when
it materi^ii^bS, will take the immediate form of a claim on
the debtor nation’s reserves of foreign exchange*
various ways in which this claim can be met*

there are

One of the

most common ways is for the debtor nation to have achieved
a positive balance on income account before the claim ma
tures, and thus pay off its debt with its increased exports*
This is just another way of saying that the reserves of for-

eign (exchange are replenished as fast as they are drained
away in debt payments*

Another ,method is for the debtor ha*,

tion to Mtadt. imports from the creditor nation at the time
the debt matures, and thus he able to pay off the debt with
the existing exports*

Bat no matter What method is used to

meet the maturing obligation, the important point is that
the, funding of income account deficits through foreign her*
rowing only postpones a required adjustment in the balance
of payments*

When the day of reckoning finally arrives, and

the adjustment cannot be postponed any longer, it may re
quire a drastic adjustment in the foreign exchange market in
order that the fundamental conditions of the international
equilibrium can be met*

Therefore, even.though not ex*

pressed immediately, the balance of international indebt*
edness still constitutes an important part of the demand for
foreign exchange*
In summing up the total supply and demand for foreign
exchange* Harsh says*
At any given time the demand and supply of foreign
exchange in. the aggregate appear respectively as the
debit and credit side of the balance of payments? and
the demand and supply for the currency of any specific
country appears as the debit, and credit side of the
balance of payments with that country*12
This does not mean that every item in the balance of pay*

12Hafsh, 0£. cit*, p*

ments must give rise to An actual transfer of payments
through the exchange market*'- If is a truism that all balance
of payments items are immediately offset by items on the op
posite side of the balance* but in some cases the offsetting
item may not be an increase or decrease in the nationts bal
ances of liquid foreign exchange*

However* even in those

cases, where there is not an immediate effect on the balance
of exchange holdings, there still must be at least an effect
on the balance of indebtedness which, as shown above* is a
contingent factor in the determination of the exchange
rate ,13

An example will clarify this statement: If a cor

poration owning a foreign subsidiary affects a transfer of
goods or evidence of debt by a simple process of inter* or
intra*corporaiion bookkeeping, there is at least an effect
on the balance of international indebtedness, if not on the
immediate reserves of foreign exchange, because it involves
the extension of credit by the parent company or its subsid
iary,

Even when there is a barter deal In goods or serv-

i$fhere is at present considerable controversy over
the role of the balance of payments in exchange rate deter*
mi nation* Ifaehltip takes an opposite view to the one ex
pressed above by Marsh, and says: "One of the most naive
misunderstandings in the theory of foreign exchanges is the
Idea that the balance of international payments shows the
supply and demand for foreign exchange and can explain the
movements of.the foreign exchange rates observed in the
market,* Maehlup, op, oft,» p, 1ST,

■

7*

ices* there is credit created, aithough the.dehit and credit
items on the balance of payments immediately offset each
other*

therefore., all transactions- in goods and services

and debt that appear in the balance of payments are posted
to the balance of trade or the balance of indebtedness* ’‘
thereby becoming parts of the aggregate supply and demand
for foreign exchange.
Briefly stated,'the exchange rate is the result of
the interaction of supply and demand*

However, to be mean-

ingful this statement must be expanded? it must go “beyond
supply and demand*w

Ibis is in keeping with conventional

value theory * which takes into account all the forces that
constitute the supply and demand and determine what a par
ticular price at a particular place will be*
It can be said that in any free market the market
supply and demand will be brought to a formal equality over
a period of time, but at the same time they need not, and
often are not* in equilibrium*

in equilibrium nr?ce is

that price in any market that is consistent no only with
the equation of supply and demand, but is also consistent
with a state of equilibrium between the two, such that any
change in price will tend to be corrected by the interaction
of supply and demand in such a way that there will be a re
turn to the former price,

in the following analysis an at-
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tempt is made to discover not only by what forces the market
for foreign exchange is brought to equality, but also in
what way an equilibrium price is established,
Equality in the balance of payments is the result of
adjustments in the volume and value of the sales and pur
chases appearing on either side of the accounts.

These ad

justments are in turn brought about by a complex adjustment
of incomes and prices, which affect the whole range of a
natIon*s economic activity,

Marsh contends that:

In international economics the dynamics of the trade
balance depends upon habits and tastes with respect to
exporting, importing, and investment abroad; and given
these, equilibrium is brought about by an adjustment in
the volume of trade itself and of its money value,14
It appears then that equality in the exchange market, like
equality in any market, is brought about by the changes in
purchases caused by changes in incomes and prices, and that
in addition to the mere balancing of exports and imports,
the exchange rate is brought into equilibrium over time by
adjustments in the national level of economic activity and
the allocation of resources.
In the operational sense the exchange rate is the in
termediary by which changes in the balance of payments (dis
regarding for the moment how these changes come about) are

14Marsh, oj>. cit., p. 197,

affected*

In causal terms the exchange rate is both a cause

and an effect*

First, since the balance of payments repre

sents the aggregate supply and demand for foreign exchange,,
it follows that the balance Of payments must be the origin
of any change in the exchange rate*
change rate is an effect*

In this sense the ex*

Second* changes in the exchange

rate cause an adjustment of prices and incomes and have con*
sequent secondary effect upon the level of economic activity
and the allocation of resources which brings about a change
in the balance of payments*

thus, the exchange rate is also

a cause of changes in the balance of payments*1®

fhe net

result of this chain of causations is an adjustment of .the
total balance of payments to the situation set up by the
original autonomous change in one part of the balance of
payments*

the autonomous change itself originates in the

complex of factors and forces which determine the level of
the balance of payments*

Marsh sums up the functioning of

the exchange rate as; «$he balancing effect of transactions
in the foreign exchange market is* therefore* part of a

^Anthony ¥* €U $:oo, "Exchange Equilibrium" (unpub
lished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge,
1949), pp* 64-6§* Koo says on. this point thats "It is often
overlooked by many that the state of balance of payments is
not Only the cause but also the result of the rate of ex
change. While the rate established at any moment on the
market is the result of the position of the balance of pay*
meiits--that position was in turn conditioned by the rate of
exchange in the last period*»
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large process, the allocation of resources among alternative
uses,11^®
An example of the functioning of the exchange rate
will clarify the relationships presented above*

Assume that

after a certain exchange rate has keen in force for some
time the amount which the inhabitants of the country desire
to lend abroad increases.

As a result the demand for foreign

currency at the ruling rate increases and exceeds the supply.

Consequently, the exchange rate falls, i.e. it now re

quires more domestic currency to buy the same amount of for
eign currency,

thus, the change in the balance of lending

has led to a change in the exchange rate*

However, the fall

in the exchange rate has the effect of making domestically
produced goods appear cheaper to foreigners, thus leading to
an increase in the volume of exports.

If the volume of ex

ports increases, the domestic price of exports cannot fall,
therefore, the value of exports, in terms of home currency,
increases*

In the case of imports the fall in the exchange

rate has the effect of making foreign goods more expensive
in the home market.

There is the possibility that even

though the physical volume of imports purchased out of a
given income declines, the total expenditure may increase

^ M a r s h , ©g* cit., p, 101*
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provided more home income is spent on imported goods*

If

imports increase as rapidly as exports, then the original
disequilibrium in the balance of payments caused by increased
foreign lending will be maintained by the fall in the rate
of exchange*
According to the theory that the exchange rate is the
equilibrating factor in the balance of payments, a rise in
the volume of lending should have the effect of bringing
about an increase in the balance of trade*

But.if, as it

appears in the example cited above, a decline in the ex
change rate will not necessarily cause an increase in the
balance of trade, the exchange rate has not acted as the
equilibrating factor and our assumption of the function and
determination of the exchange rate is incorrect,

the re

sult of a change in the balance of payments on the exchange
rate is quite clear; the important question concerns the re
action of the balance of payments to a change in the ex
change rate.

If as a result of the fall in the exchange

rate the value of imports (reckoned in domestic currency)
increases by more than the value of exports, then a fall in
the exchange rate will reduce the balance of trade.

And if,

as in our example, the balance of lending were increasing at
the same time, there would result an inequality in the bal
ance of payments as a consequence of the change in the ex-

change rate.

Thus, the example cited above does more than

just point up the causal relationships between the balance
of payments and the exchange rate? it indicates the factors
that must be known in judging the closeness of the relation
ship* namely* the elasticities of supply and demand.1^
There are four elasticities involved in computing the
v '.

effect upon the balance of trade of a change in the exchange
rate.

They ares (1) the foreign elasticity of demand for

exports, (2) the domestic elasticity of the supply of ex
ports (which is influenced by the elasticity of home demand
for exportable goods), (3) the foreign elasticity of supply
of imports* and (4) the home elasticity of demand for im
ports (which is influenced by the domestic elasticity of
supply of rival commodities).
On the export side of the balance sheet Robinson has
found that "The minimum effect of a fall in, the exchange
rate upon the value of exports is produced when the foreign
demand has zero elasticity,"18
increase in exports.

In this case there is no

The maximum effect is produced when a

perfectly elastic foreign demand is combined with a perfect-

i^Machlup says, "The study of the elasticities of de
mand and supply is* thus, the core of the theory of foreign
exchange rates.
Mac hi up, op. cit., p. Ill*
1%Obinson* op. cit,« pp. 90-91>
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ly elastic domestic supply of exports.

In this case the in

crease in the value of exports is infinitely great.
On the import side of the balance of trade the maxi
mum effect of a reduction in the rate of exchange on the
value of imports will occur when domestic demand is perfect
ly inelastic.

The minimum effect will occur when a per

fectly elastic foreign supply is combined with a perfectly
elastic home demand.

In this case imports are reduced to

zero*
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this
analysis is that, as long as home demand for imports is
greater than unitary elasticity, a decline in the exchange
rate will result in an increase in the balance of trade.
This is true, because as the value of imports falls, the
value of exports at least remains the same or rises.

How

ever, even if the demand for imports is less than unity,
the balance of trade will still increase as long as there
is a sufficient increase in the value of exports.

The in

crease in the value of exports is dependent upon the elas
ticity of foreign demand being great enough to compensate
for the low elasticity of home demand.

If this were not the

case, the balance of trade would decline when the domestic

19Ibid.t p. 91.

demand for imports was less than unitary elasticity*

It is

apparent then that as Robinson says,* * . * the balance of
trade may increase with a fall in the exchange rate even if
the elasticities of foreign and home demand are both less
than unity*”20

However, the domestic demand must be suffi-

cient to compensate for the low elasticity of foreign demand
in such a case*
It appears that given an initial change in the balance
of lending, which at the existing exchange rate causes the
balance of trade to fall short of the balance of lending,
there will be a tendency for the exchange rate to depreci
ate*

Under conditions, where there is a perfectly elastic

foreign demand and a perfectly elastic domestic supply of
exportable goods, the equation of the balance of lending
with the balance of trade is restored by the increase in the
balance of trade and further depreciation of the exchange
rate is prevented*21

therefore, our assumption about the

equalizing effect of the exchange rate has been affirmed#22

20Ibid., p* 92.
2iRobinson finds that these are the conditions that
exist between Countries on the gold standard* Ibid* * p* S3*
22The conclusion holds true for free exchangesas well
as the gold standard, because as Robinson points out *The
only difference between the two is that under the gold
standard the authorities are committed to one particular ex-

In the analysis thus far only a change in the balance,
of lending, which brings about a change in the balance of
payments through a change in the exchange rate, has been
considered*

This, however, is only one side of the balance

of payments*^

Consideration is now given to the effect

that a change in the balance of trade will have upon the ex
change rate and how equality in the balance of payments as a
whole is achieved after the initial change*
When viewing it from the standpoint of the effect
upon the exchange rate, an autonomous change in the balance
of trade is quite different from a change in the balance of
lending, because the change in the balance of trade produces
a direct effect on the balance of lending,

the question of

whether a change in the balance of trade will have any effect
on the rate of exchange depends upon the domestic rate of

change rate so that the equilibrium of the balance of pay
ments must be preserved in face of changing conditions
entirely by inducing changes in the level of incomes, and
not at all by allowing variations in the exchange rate,
while under free exchanges the authorities have some lati
tude in their choice between the two methods of adjustment*”
Ibid,, p.* 103.
23There are some grounds for saying that it is the
least important side of the balance of payments as far as
the determination of the exchange rate is concerned** ’ Keynes
says, ”Historically, the volume of foreign investment has
tended, I think, to adjust itself— at least to a certain
extent— to the balance of trade, rather than the other way
around, the former being sensitive and the latter insensi
tive. ° dohn Haynard Keynes, ”The German Transfer Problem,”
The Economic Journal, 1929, p. 6* (cited by goo, op. cit*,

p. I'm:

—

interest*
If the balance of trade increases, there will be an
increase in the rate of foreign leading, or if the balance
of trade decreases, there will be aa increase in the rate
of fordign borrowing,

fhis reciprocal relationship is pos

sible without a connecting change in the rate of exchange,
because the rate of saving in the home country exceeds or
falls short of home investment according to whether the
balance of trade is positive or negative*

Formally* a part

of any increase in the wealth (represented by domestic
savings) of the inhabitants of the home country will be
used to acquire foreign securities or make loans abroad,
thus, an increase in the balance of trade with its concom
itant increase in home savings results in an increase in
foreign lending on the balance of leading*

Conversely,

when the balance of trade falls off, lending by the rest
of the world to the home country is directly increased.
sdiether or not the direct change in the balance of
lending is sufficient to compensate for the change in the
balance of trade and bring the balance of payments into
equality without a change-in the exchange rate, is depend
ent upon the domestic rate of interest*

In a theoretical

ly perfect world capital market, in which the owners of
wealth are indifferent between foreign or home securities,

it would be possible for the exchange rate to remain un
changed as a result of a change in the balance of trader
Hider such perfect conditions the world would automatical
ly take up the excess of domestic securities over savings
that would result from a decrease in the balance of trade
without a change in the relative interest rates*

In the

real world, however* such a situation does not prevail*
Generally, the home rate of interest must rise relative
to the foreign rate if foreign purchases of domestic se
curities are to be increased*

In the event that the rate

of interest would fail to rise as much relatively as the
balance of trade drops, foreigners would not

be

induced

to increase their holdings Of domestic securities and the
rate of exchange would fall in order to bring the balance
of payments to equality,

the situation then that prevails

in the real world is one in which an autonomous change in
the balance of trade will require a change in the interest
rate, or a change in the rate of exchange, or a change in
both*

Even if the balancing action were restricted to

Just the home rate of interest, this in itself would not
be a guarantee that the rate of exchange would not be ef
fected, since there is a close relationship between the
rate of interest and the rate of exchange*

A change in

the rate of interest could be a force making for disequi

librium in the rate of exchange.

Because, although the

change would bring the balance of payments into equilibri
um, it might also start a capital inflow that would put a
strain on the exchange rate,
Before examining the relation of the interest rate
to the rate of exchange in more detail it is helpful to
clarify the concepts of exchange rate and balance of pay
ments equilibrium,

The general concept of an equilibrium

price has a rather strict interpretation when applied to
the rate of exchange,

As Robinson describes it

Equilibrium with the given exchange rate is reached
when at a constant rate of interest, the balance of
trade, excluding gold, is brought to equality with the
balance of nonrecurrent lending, and no transfer of
funds or movement of gold is talcing place,24
However, it must be understood that exchange equilibrium
in the sense that no transfer borrowing or gold movement
is taking place is quite different from the concept of full
balance of payments equilibrium.

For a full balance of

payments equilibrium to exist there must be no borrowing
or lending of any kind taking place*

This condition is

necessary, because as long as borrowing is taking place
there is an invisible import represented by the interest
payments on the debt.

As these interest payments mount

24Robinson, oj>, c i t , , p, 101,

up over the life of the debt (other things being equal)
the persistently borrowing nation will have a failing bal
ance of trade.

Full long period equilibrium is said to

exist only when * * * * interest and savings are equal to
zero, and imports are equal to

e x p o r t s

,"25

However, since

this state is very seldom, if ever, attained in the real
world, we shall concentrate oar attention on the process
of attaining an exchange equilibrium, the main conditions
of which are that interest payments are small in relation
to current borrowing, and there is no gold movement or
transfer borrowing taking place*
Given the case in which the home rate of interest
rises, if other things remain equal, there will be a ,
three-stage effect on the exchange rate*

In the first

stage there is an increase in the level of foreign borrow
ing as a result of the increase in the domestic rate Of
interest*

This increase in borrowing may be either an in

crease in the share of world savings devoted to the home
country, a situation that will persist as long as the state
of confidence and the high relative rate Of interest is
maintained, or a nonrecurrent inflow of funds formerly held
abroad*

Bach of the transfers involved in this shift can

25Ibid» , p. 100.

affect the exchange rate only as it is made so that to
maintains given volume of transfers over a period of time
there, would have to he a constant rise in the relative
interest ratej therefore, they are generally nonrecurring
in nature*

In this stage the rate Of exchange is not in

equilibrium,since there is a considerable amount of trans
fer borrowing as a resul t of the rise in the domes tic rate
of interest*

During the second stage of its effect the

rise in the interest rate has a tendency to curtail domes
tic investment and thereby induce a decline in the level
of economic activity and incomes*

A general curtailment

of incomes and activity will force the export industry to
contract*

In relative terms, the domestic export industry

will not decline as much as the domestic import market,
because a reduction in demand has a tendency to increase
the supply of exportable goods; and at least part of the
reduction of foreign incomes resulting from the decline of
the domestic import market will be subtracted from savings
with the result that foreign demand will not be .drastical* ■
ly effected*

therefore, even if the supply price of ex*

ports in the domestic market is uneffected by the decline
in income and activity, it is still impossible for exports
to be curtailed to the extent of imports.

It follows that

a rise in the domestic rate of interest tends to cause a
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decline in imports relative to exports resulting in an in
crease in the balance of trade,

through this process of

increasing the balance of trade the balance of payments is
again brought into equilibrium*

There is no need for fur

ther transfer borrowing, and if the increase in the balance
of trade is sufficient to equal the original increase in
the balance of lending, there is no further need for an
increase la the domestic rate of interest,

All pressure

has been removed from the rate of exchange and it is pos
sible to say that at the given rate the balance of recur
rent lending and the balance of trade are in equality at a
stable rate of interest.

This equilibrium, however, has

been attained at the expense of employment in the home
country.
The third stage of the effect of the interest rate
is attained when the equilibrium rate of exchange is sus
tained by a decrease in the domestic rate of money wages
that results from the unemployment induced by the rise in
the interest rate*

This reduction in wages is absolutely

necessary if the exchange equilibrium is to be maintained,
A decrease in domestic wages and a fall in the exchange
rate both represent a decline in domestic incomes and
prices measured in terms of foreign currency.

The effect

oh the value of imports and exports, in terms of foreign

currency* Is also the same for a fall in Mages as far
'decline la the exchange rate since in bath'eases the domes*
tic purchasing -power -of a given amount of foreign currency
increa^S': by ^anreqnai amount,

the

crease 'in /wages

in .the baiane e of

is

correspoading to
domestic martst

an .Increase

a given

and

level

of

net effect of the do*

trade

demand

effective

in

.

’

the

the'balance of\naymenfs is maintained

in equilibrium^'
The conclusion that can' be- drawn from, the above
:
i
*

analysis is that, as Dr. Eoe f inds, w -. * . exchange adjust*.'
ment is an intricate network of interacting basic elements
in/a system of mutual dependence,"26

There is no one 'ffci*.-

of exchange which is an equilibrium rate corresponding- to
the-state-of world demand and technology.

There is, how*

everf 'In:asy.given situation an equilibrium rate eorrespending to a level of effective demand and' rate-of inter*
est*.

it is':possible- to make nearly 'any rate -Of exchange.'

the equilibrium rate by Siteflag the interest rate; or on
the. ether habd* it is possible to make any' rate of ex
change co^patibie'. with any interest rate provided money
wages,can be sufficiently altered*

-

8?
II.

THE THEORY OP EXCHANGE RATES
UNDER EXCHANGE CONTROL

A necessary preface to the theory of exchanges
under control is a description Of the institutional frame*
worh in which exchange control developed, 3
Exchange controls can best he viewed as ah expres
sion of the general trend toward a greater expression of
national economic policy and interest in the field of in*
ternational economic relations,

the general conditions

that gave rise to this tendency have heen outlined by
Dr. Stevens as beingi
A retardation in the twentieth century of the ex
pansionary economic dynamic which seems, retrospec
tively, to have character!zed the nineteenth. An An*
giocentrie world became decentralized in terms of
(a) political and military power, (b) industrial pro
ductive power, and (c) financial relationships.

International peace became less secure,

The scope and effectiveness of positive govern
mental powers increased enormously*27
Under the influence of these general conditions in
the course of

several decades national monetary policy

27Robert Waren Stevens, ^Partial Equilibrium in the
Theory of. International Be^no^nies,, (unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, .1049),
p. 112*

throughout the world has gradually shifted its emphasis
from external to internal stability*

As a result of this

shift the balance of payments* which originally had been
the chief object of official concern* became a secondary
matter.,

thile this shif t in national economic thinking

was taking place* there was a series of developments which
led to new problems in the balance of payments*
were:

these

(1) the volume of liquid funds (cash and short term

securities) increased considerably, (2) the experience of
World war I and its economic aftermath undermined the
confidence in the major currencies of the world* and (3)
trade barriers and other obstacles to trade were multi
plied,

The net effect of these developments was that the

danger of capital flight was intensified and nations were
deprived of a means of quick and easy correction of bal
ance of payments disequilibium on capital and current ac
count.
The logical outcome of these conflicting trends was
foreign exchange control*

The national state came to be

recognised as an economic unit making unified rational
choices to further the economic interest of its people.
So the national state assumed the task of deciding when
the welfare of the nation could be maximized by altering
the conditions of international trade.

In most cases the
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original legislation establishing exchange control was of
an emergency character which later underwent much experi
mentation and change.

However, it is possible to general

ize and say that restrictive national policies seem to
have been resorted to in order to serve some more or less
clear-cut national economic interest such as protection of
the balance of payments, stability of currency, or nation
al self-sufficiency*
Types and degrees of exchange control.

The earliest

types of exchange control originated under the internation
al gold standard,

ttoder this standard the exchange rate

of a nation, in which money wages do not readily yield to
the pressure of unemployment, could only be maintained by
recurrent period of severe unemployment.

The central

banks of these nations developed certain monetary means of
preserving the stability of the exchange rate within cer
tain narrow limits while still being able to meet the de
mands of domestic credit policy*
dealings in forward

Stabilization funds and

exchange were the two most important

means devised by the banks*
The system of forward

exchanges suggested by Keynes

was intended as a means of enabling a central bank to raise
or lower its discount rate relative to foreign rates with
out thereby attracting or repelling foreign short-term

funds,

For example, if the Bank, of England wished to

lower the bank rate without causing an efflux of money, it
would offer to sell forward exchange at a discount equiva
lent to the reduction in the short-term interest rate caused
by the redaction la the bank rate.

According to Ur* J&oo,

there is one severe limitation in the use of the system of
forward exchanges*

He says n * • * the bank still cannot

prevent an outflow of.money by selling forward exchange
for which spot exchange is already at or near gold export
point, or an inflow of money when the spot quotation is at
or near the gold import point of foreign exchange*
This is true, because selling discounted forward exchangeat or near the gold point would result in a large specula
tive movement of funds by arbitrageurs.

Apparently the

only advantage of using forward exchange lies in the pos
sibility that under certain conditions gold movements can
be prevented and the economic community given encourage
ment in speculative activity while at the same time a
lower interest rate would be established without unneces
sary psychological disturbance*
t

The stabilisation fund was originally intended as a
device to enable countries on inconvertible paper standard
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to achieve a certain degree of exchange stability with na»
tions on the gold standard* It was not until England
'' .*
.
.
'
'
started to use it successfully as a means of insulating
the domestic market that it was discovered that it was
possible to achieve a dual purpose by stabilizing the ex*
change rate*
After the collapse of the gold standard the stabi
lization fund was retained*

Through the operation of the

fund the exchange rate was "pegged*' in terms of some
standard such as gold or foreign currency*

The pegged

rate can only be maintained by a government or some other
agency which stands ready to buy and sell unlimited a•e

mounts of currency at the pegged rate*

The difference

between the official buying and selling rates defines the
limits within which the rates may fluctuate*

The stabili

ty of the exchange rate under a system of pegged exchanges
generally imposes no restriction on demand, not even the
restriction of a higher price (except within the buying
and selling rates), nor can pegging increase a nation^ re
serves of gold and foreign exchange.

The essential func

tion of the stabilization fund is the mobilization of the
existing foreign exchange resources in such a way that the
foreign value of the home currency can be maintained by
the supplementary demand and supply of the monetary author-
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ity,

Consequently,, the pegging process is no stronger

than the resources of gold and foreign exchange available
to the administrating authority.

Once these resources are

exhausted: there is nothing left to peg with unless foreign
loans .are'relied .upon as temporary 'relief;*
An apiilye or passive balance of payments under a
gold -standard;or any system of stable exchanges tends to
cause expansion or contraction not only in the stock of
money but in the flow of money incomes as well.

HOutrali-

cation by means of a stabilization fund can only stabilize
the national monetary supply or the cash base of the do
mestic credit system,#

therefore, even if the quantity of

money outstanding is rendered insensitive to gold and
capital flows, the incomes, and hence the stability of
employment, are still influenced by the balance of pay
ments*

In the Quest for greater internal stability a con

stant Quantity of money is not enough for achieving this
.aim, and in some cases may not even be desirable.
The existence of an equilibrium rate of exchange is
a prerequisite to. the selective offsetting of gold and
capital flows,

If the rate of exchange of a country is

undervalued, the influx of short-term and long-term capi
tal in the form of purchases of OQuity securities cannot
be justified solely on the grounds of the relative yield
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and interest rate.

Since, as noted above, the stabiliza

tion fund can influence both the rate of exchange and do
mestic credit, the operators of the fund mast havej

(1)

the criteria for finding an equilibrium level of the rate
of exchange and (2) the criteria for the selective off
setting of gold and capital flows.

So long as there is a

more or less routine policy of offsetting movements of the
foreign balance while the rate of exchange is at an equi
librium level or in a state of finding its equilibrium
level with no disturbance in other important currencies,
the operation of the stabilization fund is likely to be
successful.

But as soon as the disturbance in the ba

lance of payments comes from say, a world-wide depression
culminating in unstable currencies of other nations, the
monetary authority in charge of the stabilization fund
will face the dilemma of either minimizing the variations
of the rate of exchange of an important currency or main
taining the proper relationship between domestic prices
and the rest of the world.

Dr. Koo finds that

In the short period, in order to maintain the con
tinuity in financial transactions, it is desirable
that the rate should be maintained as far as possible.
But for the maintenance of economic interrelationships
of a more fundamental character, wide variations in
market fluctuations may not be inappropriate.2**

29Ibi d . , p. 185.
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It appears, therefore, that the stabilization fund does
not offer any permanent escape from the old conflict be
tween stable exchanges and stable prices*
In times of international instability there has
been a tendency for nations to attempt to solve the prob
lem of deciding whether to offset variations in key cur
rencies or maintain proper price relationships with the
world by adopting a more strict type of exchange control
under which the national reserves of foreign exchange are
more completely controlled*

Under such systems all the

receipts of foreign exchange are concentrated in the hands
of the monetary authority and licenses are required for
the use of foreign exchange.

This does not, of course,

increase the supply of foreign exchange, but it does make
rationing a more effective means of control.

The monetary

authority has absolute power over the allocation of for
eign exchange reserves, and therefore it may through a
rationing program exert a very strong influence over how
the importers of the nation use the. exchange reserves.
The strict form of exchange control is differentiated from
the free rate by the fact that under the former foreign
exchange is no longer freely available to all that can
meet the price*

Under strict control the monetary author

ity decides who will get exchange, " . . .

and the decision
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is, at the core, unavoidably political♦«30
It is possible to distinguish two degrees of strict
exchange control:

(1) the control of capital movements and

(2) control of current account transactions,

The first

degree of control is at present generally regarded as being
preferable to monetary instability and hence is respectable.
The International Monetary Fund permits, and even in some
cases requires, control over capital movements, while it
frowns on control of current account transactions except
as an emergency measure.
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary
to regulate international capital movements, but no
member may exercise these controls in such a manner
which will restrict payments on current transactions
or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in set
tlement of commitments except as provided in Article
VII, Section 3 (b), and in Article XIV, Section 2,3-1
The most advanced type of exchange control, and the
one most often resorted to by nations with chronic balance
of payments disequilibrium, is strict exchange control
i

with rationing of exchange on both capital and current ac
count,

The remainder of the discussion will be carried on

in terms of this type of control.

3^Marsh, oj>. cit.« p. 197.
31The International Monetary Fund, Articles of
Agreement. "Control of Capital Transfers,” (International
Monetary Fund, Washington, B. C., 1944), Article VI, Sec
tion III, p. 12.
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The functions of exchange control*

The following

are some of the main functions that exchange control per
forms

(1) it is a powerful instrument of monetary policy

f o r .the protection of:exchange reserves and the mainte
nance of exchange stability under conditions where the
traditional central bank techniques have failed} <2) it
serves as a means of regulating foreign trade and imple
menting the bilateral obligations willingly or unwilling
ly assumed by many nations; (8) it serves as an instrument
of economic development through the protection and stimu
lation that if can provide for growing industries and
through the husbanding of exchange reserves for develop
ment purposes; (4) it is the means by which many govern
ments may exert a greater degree of political and economic
control * and serve as a means of revenue.82
The determination of exchange rates under a system
of exchange control does not lend itself readily to gener
alization since the fundamental factor in the determina
tion of rates under control is the authority^ estimation
of the national interest and welfare*

tfcifortunately there

are few criteria that can be used determining the welfare

32Henry Christopher wailich, Monetary Problems of
an Export.Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1950/ , p. 255.' '

interests of a nation.

However, it is possible, despite

this handicap, to consider some of the principles that
must he followed in an attempt by a national authority to
determine an exchanj»e rate that is in harmony with extern
nai obligations and gives some promise of permanence.

In

general the object of the controlling authority is to ae*
loot,
. • a rate which in the light of prospective
conditions* including governmental policies and pro-*
grams (fiscal policies.'* tariffs' and' Other restrictions
on trade),* gives promise of yielding an approximate,
balance in a country*® foreign account over a period
Of years Cin so far' as a' rate by. itself can do this)* ■
and will at the same time provide cost and Income
relationships with foreign countries which will permit
a maximum flow of trade in both directions at a high
level of domestic activity and employment,33
It appears then that the object of exchange control is to
select and maintain a stable exchange rate that will give
equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Establishing of an equilibrium' rate Of exchange
under exchange control is a complicated matter*

It is

made especially so by the fact that under controls equi
librium can be forced at nearly any rate,

Once selected a

given, rate can be maintained indefinitely as long as do
mestic incomes' and. activity are adjusted to external,
changes*' 'However* these internal adjustments are just

33foung* oj>, elf.,* p.* 389.
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what exchange, control attempts to avoid.

The ideal ex

change rate in the eyes of the monetary authority of a na
tion is one which is stable, bat does not require varia
tions in the internal economy to maintain that stability,
hits# most ideals this one is impossible of attainment*

An

ideal exchange rate could only be possible in a world in
which the international economy was completely stable*
Such a universal equilibrium is difficult to imagine in
the, real world*
.

.

.

.

Falling short of the ideal, the object of

1

exchange control is to select a rate that will give the
highest level of domestic activity possible in any given
world situation,

dnee the rate is selected the function

of exchange control is to prevent excesses of supply or
demand from affecting the rate.

Changes in the rate are

only infrequently permitted under exchange control*
In commodity markets, under perfect competition, an
excess of supply or demand at the prevailing price results
in price change.

Similarly, in the absence of arbitrary

interference in the market it may happen that due to an
excess demand the demand and supply of foreign exchange
will be equal only at a depreciated rate,

Woodly says that

tJhder such circumstances the balance Of payments
disequilibrium which may be said to exist is complete
ly parallel to the hypothetical disequilibrium in the
commodity market of perfect competition when the price
is not equivalent to that indicated by the intersec-
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tion of supply and demand.
Under free exchange the disequilibrium will be
eliminated by a decline in the exchange rate, or as indi
cated by the general theory of exchanges a change in the
domestic interest rate.

Under exchange controls, if the

monetary authority refuses to alter the rate, there will
be a chronic excess demand for foreign exchange reflecting
the too low price of foreign currency.

This situation re

quires that some measures be taken which will either re
duce the demand for, or increase the supply of, foreign
exchange,

tftitil such measures are affected disequilibrium

is said to exist in the balance of payments and the ex
change rate can only be maintained by the reduction of ex
change reserves or balance of payments borrowing*

Since

neither loss of exchange reserves or balance of payments
borrowing can be long-run policies some means must be
found to "remedy" the balance of payments disequilibrium
and stop the dependence on temporary financing*

The rem

edies for balance of payments disequilibrium have been
discussed.

They are changes in incomes and prices and

shifts in the allocation of resources.

^4'«'illiam J* R. Tfoodly, "Canada*s Post-War Balance
of Payments? A Case Study of Remedies for Balance of Pay
ments Disequilibrium" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation,
Cornell University, Ithaca, 1949), p. 15.
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Under 3 trie t exchange control an excess demand for
foreign exchange is met by rationing available exchange
resources*

toungf in examining the effect of the free

rate and the controlled rate on the volume of trade, finds
that:
It is possible* although unlikely, that a rate that
requires rationing of exchange will yield as large a
volume of trade is spite of the restrictions and pro*
; hibifi©as placed on many transactions and the reduced
incentive to exports,^5
the possibility of having as large a volume of trade under
a rate which requires rationing as under a free rate only
arises when the controlled rate provides more favorable
terms of trade and thereby permits a nation to pay

for

the

same or even more imports with the same or even fewer ex*
ports which are sold at higher prices in terms of domestic
currency*

In such a case the total volume of trade would

not be reduced by exchange controls,
assertst

HOweveri as Toung

«It is doubtful whether such a situation exists

in the case of many, if any cow* tries**®®
lie conclusion that can be drawn

from

the above

analysis is that exchange control as a long-run policy is
inconsistent for a nation that is attempting to maximize
external trade*

In the dynamic world any exchange rate once

3S¥otmg, 0£. pit*, p. 501.
i

36lbid*
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established is subject to disequilibratiag forces*

Under

exchange rationing there would be a reduction in the vol
ume of trade until the disequilibrium was corrected*
Although inconsistent as a long-run policy exchange
control still has considerable merit as a short-run method
of meeting a disequilibrium in the balance of payments*
One of the conditions that is the most conducive to the
use of exchange control is the temporary emergency situa
tion in which a nation suffers a short-run balance of pay
ments disequilibrium*

An example of this situation would

be a deficit on the balance of trade as a result of a crop
failure or some relatively short run disturbance*

It is

preferable in such cases to use exchange controls rather
than permit the machinery of fundamental readjustment to
start operating when it seems clear that the disequilib-.
rium is only temporary.
Another strong case for exchange control is the
fact that such a system allows a nation to select the
types of imported goods that are the most useful to the
economy, especially goods that are needed to promote eco
nomic development,
postwar

this was the case in the immediate

world when many nations used exchange controls as

a means of concentrating their reserves of foreign ex
change on the purchase of capital goods needed to rehabi-

1 i tate 'fbeAr devas tated economies. ■
#«stifioatioa-■i'OiO exchange control can fee found in.
eases*.
tially -a-siep*gs|f

Exchange control is essen

It is not capable of dealing

with the conditions of a fundamental diseqailihriuia in the
haiano:t' of payments* the solntioa of which lie® in ad$asiin./the-domestic economy*.

Sxchange controls may be

nstfni ;'t# m'nation as a ‘means of postponing the solution

of a fundamental disequilibriumor in stretching the sol ac
tion over a period of time provided the nation in willing
to accept the redaction in the volume of trade that resalt# from;-ratiohiag Of exchange*

the real value of ex

change control* in the last analysis* is the elimination
of abrupt nhange® Ip the internal economy*

THE CAMDIAN EXGBANEE BATE
I,

THE EXGHx''iNGE BATE HISTORICALLY (1857-1939)

The Canadian dollar, which was adopted as Canada*s
official unit of account in 1857, was the equivalent of
15/73 of a pound sterling* i,e, the pound at par was worth
I 4,866 in Canadian currency.

This rate of exchange was

maintained with only slight variations between the import
and export gold points until the Outbreak of World War I*
Except for the period 1867-78, when the united States dol
lar was not redeemable in gold, the Canadian and United
States dollar exchanged at par.

But from 1878 until World

i&r I the -Americas exchange rate fluctuated between the
gold points (under $ 2 per $ 1,00©),
iSfeen the United Kingdom and Canada abandoned the
gold standard at the outbreak of Uorld War % the pound
sterling and the Canadian dollar were discounted in the
lew York exchange market.

The discount was kept from

falling too far by the sale of American assets by the
United Kingdom, and by direct borrowing in the United
States,

After the American entry into the war the United

States government through a series of loans aided Canada
and the United Kingdom in maintaining their rates.
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In the immediate postwar period all support was
removed from the exchange rates and the British pound went
as low as $ 3,18 and the Canadian dollar as low as 82 cents
in the Hew 'fork market.

By 1921 the rates had practically

returned to par* and in April, 1926 the United Kingdom
resumed gold paymentts.
1926,

Canada followed salt on duly 1,

From 1926 until 1929 the rates remained within the

gold import and export points,

However, is 1929 the Cana-*

dlan dollar fell to a slight discount in Hew York*

this

condition prevailed with only a few exceptions Until 1939
and the outbreak of World Wat* II.

the discount of this

period was not severe since the dollar rates were below
the gold export point for only a few scattered intervals,
IX,

WAITIMvMCHAHSSS: {1939-1945)

Immediately on the outbreak of World War II the
United Kingdom and the other nations of the sterling area
introduced exchange controls.

The buying and selling

rates of the pound were set at $ 4*025 respectively in
terms of United States dollars.

In addition, the United

Kingdom, in order to conserve its reserves of American
dollars, ended the free convertibility of sterling#

The

rate of the Canadian dollar in the Hew York market imme
diately began to decline,

Knox explains the situation as
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on© in which:
Jfe Cthe Canadians! are dependent
, . on the free
convertibility and a high value of sterling in lew
York, When sterling has fallen there, so has the
Canadian dollar; when convertibility of sterling into
American dollars has been restricted, rigid control of
the
of American dollars has been forced upon us,*
Five days after Canada entered the war on September
10, 1939, the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board came
into being,;

The main functions of this Board were:

Cl)

to maintain the balances of foreign exchange and marketable foreign securities in order that the existing foreign
assets would not be dissipated by their owners; (2) to
control exports and imports so that a minimum of strain was
placed on the balance of payments by variations in the ex
change rate;2 <3) to control the exports of foreign and
domestic capital in order to prevent large amounts of cap
ital from leaving the country at a time that it was sorely
needed and to eliminate any pressure on the exchange rate
from capital flight,
to this last function,

Woodly assigns the most importance
He says, "The chief purpose of ex-

*F, A, Knox, “Canada*s Balance of International Pay
ments 1940-45,!* Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science, Kill (August, 1947>, 345,,
2A s Knox says: "The decision to end the convertibi
lity of sterling in Hew fork split the Canadian balance of
payments into two independent sections* one with the dollar
and one with the sterling area," Ibid*» p, 346,

change control was to assure that there would not he de
mands oil dollar reserves through capital outflow supple
mentary to those on current account***^ 5
fhQ basis for wartime foreign exchange control was
established in 1905 with the organization of a foreign ex
change fund*

The Bank of Canada was established in 1 9 3 5 ,

and at that time much emphasis was placed on its role in
influencing international finance and exchange rates*
This was indicated in the declaration of purpose of the
Ac tt
♦ * • to establish a central bank in Canada, to
regulate credit and currency in the best interest of
the economic life of the nation, to control and pro
tect the external value of the national monetary unit
and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the
general level of production, trade, prices* and em
ployment.4
Legislation accompanying this act created an exchange
stabilization fund.

The fund* however* was never used to

influence the external value of the dollar.

The main rea

son for not using the fund was the lack of serious varia-

%i lliam J. R* loodly, ^Canadais Post-ft'ar Balance
of payment's j A Case Study of Remedies, for Balance of Pay
ments Mse^uilihriom* (unpublished Pectoral dissertation*
Cornell University, ifhaca> 1949), p. 84*
40ominion of Canada, George t*, 25-26 (1935), €« 60*
(cited by Weedly, op. cit*, p*
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fions in the exchange rate,5

When the Foreign Exchange

Beard was created under the emergency war powers of the
government, the assets of the stabilization fund were turned
over to it.

On April 30, 1940, an Order in Council com-

polled the sale of all domestically held exchange to the
Board, and at the same time the Bank of Canada transferred
its holdings of gold and exchange to the Board*
Although the policies applied by the Board were
extremely complex and varied, they did follow certain guid
ing principles.,

The main principle of operation appears in

the provision of the Act creating the Board which required
that “Wo person shall export any good, currency, securities*
foreign exchange or other property from Canada except under
and in accordance with the terms of a license granted by
the Board*1*5

The Board adopted the policy that all ex

ports must be paid for in United States dollars or curren
cy that was freely convertible,

The only exception was in

the case of Commonwealth countries where Canadian dollars
or Sterling would be accepted.

The proceeds of all goods

5hOodly'says that *No significant variations oc
curred* however, because of the stable relations between
sterling and the United States dollar provided by the Tri
partite Agreement,* goodly, op. clt., p, 81.
%0minion of Canada, Privy Council, 2718 (September,
15, 1939X* (cited by Knox, op, cit,« p.354).
'
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and services exported to the dollar area had to be turned
over to the Board.

The Board sold United States dollars

at a given rate for all customary imports and payments for
services.

On capital account the Board refused to convert

to United States dollars the proceeds of non-resident
sales of securities, but it did provide foreign exchange
for the payment of current earnings on foreign capital.
Foreign investors were free to sell their securities at
any time so long as an equal amount was invested in other
Canadian securities.

These capital restrictions of the

Board applied only to securities outstanding before the
imposition of exchange controls.
There were no controls on the holding of sterling
in Canada.

Payments could be made for imports in Canadian

dollars or sterling; and Canadian exports could be sold
for sterling or Canadian dollars, so long as the former
had been obtained through legitimate exchange control
channels.

The reason for this lack of Canadian control

over sterling is explained by *oodly as being the result
of * * • ♦ the shortage of Canadian dollars abroad which
placed the need for controls on the foreign exchange con
trol authorities in the sterling area countries.

% o o d l y , o p . c i t ., p. 86.

fhe Canadian wartime exchange situation became
complicated in late 1940 and 1941*

The characteristic

bilateral imbalance of the Canadian balance of* payments
was intensified by the lack of convertibility*

Canada was

determined to supply the United Kingdom with all the war
materials that she possibly could afford, but to do this
meant increased imports from the United States at a time
when the customary methods of acquiring the means of pay
ments could not be used*

Consequently, Canada experienced

heavy losses on current account with the Uni ted States
during 1940-41 *

these losses cut deeply into the Canadian

reserves of foreign exchange and gold*
a severe dollar shortage*

Canada experienced

However, this dollar shortage

was not reflected in the exchange rate which remained at
the official United States dollar and sterling buying and
selling rates of $ 1*10 and $ 1.11* and $ 4*43 and | 4.47
respectively, that had been established on September 15,
1939*
In’the period from 1939 to 1941 the Canadian balance
of trade with the sterling area was very favorable due to
the heavy British demand for war materials*

The net credit

balance on current account rose from $ 137,000,990 in 1939
to

734,000,000 in 1941,

in normal times the British paid

for their imports from Canada with American dollars and

iio
convertible sterling, but in the war period Britain was
using all available United States dollar reserves for the
direct purchase of American goods, and, therefore* incon
vertible sterling was the only means of payment available
to the Canadians,

the Canadian balance on current account

with the United States increased its net negative balance
from $ 116,000,000 in 1039 to $ 316,000,000 in 1941*

the

greater part of this increase was the result of Canadian
purchases of component parts of tanks, trucks, airplanes,
and partly manufactured goods for further processing and
Shipment to the United Kingdom*

Canada was selling more

to Britain than she was buying, and buying more from the
United States than she wap selling there, not an unusual
situation for Canada, but complicated by the fact that
excess sterling could not be used to make up the differ*
ence*
Lend-Lease aid from the United States could have
offered a remedy to the Canadian trading problem, but Ca
nada was not eligible for aid under the program*

One of

the main conditions for eligibility under Lend-lease was
that the nation to receive aid had exhausted all possible
means of dollar payment before receiving assistance,

Ca

nadian holdings of United ,States securities and direct in
vestment were extremely high in relation to her size? and

Ill

the forced liquidation of these assets would have been
especially harmful to Canada since the proceeds would not
be used for internal purposes but for aid to Britain*

fhe

loss of these assets would have represented an absolute
decline in home investment funds at a time when they were
needed the most.
A solution to the Canadian dollar shortage was
found after the American entry into the war in December,
1940*

The Hyde Park Declaration of April 20, 1941, was

the result of joint British, Canadian, and American nego
tiations*

The essence of the declaration was that:

* « » as a general principle in mobilizing the
resources of this continent each country should pro
vide the other with the defence articles which it is.
best able to produce, and above all, to produce
quickly, and, that production programs should be co
ordinated to this end.8
This in effect meant that the United States would
purchase those goods vital to the war effort that Canada
could produce best and concentrate its efforts on other
goods.

The United States thereby furnished Canada with

the funds necessary to purchase the American goods used to
aid Br5 tain*

A further provision was made in the Lend-

8Dominion of Canada, &ebat&g.> ^SmS.
gfflgfflW,,
1941, Vol. Ill (April 28, 1941), p* 2286.
(cited by
Inox, op* cit., p. 350).
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Lease policy that also helped solve the Canadian dollar
shortage; Great Britain was permitted to purchase compo
nent parts in the United States under Lend-Lease and for
ward them to Canada for assembly*

this relieved Canada of

the drain on reserves that the purchase of parts had former
ly represented*
Ah indication of the success of the Hyde Park Plan
is the fact that the net negative balance on current ac
count with the United States fell from $ 318,000,000 in
1941 to $ 19,000,000 in 1943*

During the same period the

Canadian holdings of gold and United States dollars rose
from $ 187,600,000 to $ 649,000,000*

Another indication

of the success of the plan is pointed out by Knox, who
says,
* , . Canada was able to avoid direct government
borrowing in the United States to maintain its ex
change position and was able to add to our exchange
reserves the whole of the capital imports which re
sulted from the sale of privately owned securities in
the United States*9
To sum up, the Canadian wartime dollar shortage
that resulted from the great increase in imports from the
United States, and inability to convert sterling to pay
for them, was solved in part by the control of exports of
capital through exchange control, the sale of munitions

%hox,

o p * c i t * * p. 351.
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and war supplies to the Uhited States government* the
United States expenditures in Canada* the abnormally large
sale of grain to the United States, and the persistent and
growing trend of American investors to purchase Canadian
bonds (a trend from 1942).10
The United Kingdom*s section of the Canadian bal
ance sheet was unaffected by the forces that solved the
difficulties in the American balance.

The Canadian dollar

deficit of the sterling area averaged over a billion dol
lars a year from 1942 to 1945.

During 1939 and 1940 Ca

nada had demanded that payment for export to the sterling
area be made in gold or United States dollars and only
when these were exhausted would Canadian dollars and se
curities be accepted.
ous*

In 1942 the situation became seri

The sterling area could only provide sterling to pay

for its purchases.

It was virtually impossible to balance

the sterling account, which had grown from a net positive
balance on Canadian current account of $ 1,223,000,000 in
1942 (the highest in the history of British-Canadian trade).
Increased Canadian imports as a method of offsetting this
balance was out of question in view of the demands of the

10C. D. Blyth, "Some Aspects of Canada*s Interna
tional Financial Relations," Canadian lattcaal, SiL Sfi.gn,ttaica
and Political Science. XII (August, 1946), 303-04.

war Effort on overseas economies*.

likewise, because of

the war effort, thevolume of Canadian exports to the
sterling area could not be reduced*

fhe Canadian govern**

ment, however, was unwilling to continue accepting large
amounts of Inconvertible sterling as payments for exports*
A solution to the problem was arrived at in 1942 when the
Canadian Parliament voted a Mutual Aid export credit of a
billion dollars to the United Kingdom*

No assets were ex

changed; the export credit was a drawing account that the
United Kingdom could use to supplement whatever other ac
ceptable means of payment it could find*

In subsequent

Mutual Aid appropriation acts a total of $ 2,250,000,000
was expended for aid to the United Nations in the years
1943-45,

Eighty-five percent of this total went to the

United Kingdom,
fhe effect of Mutual Aid and other loans made to
the sterling area was to relieve the sterling section of
the Canadian balance of payments of the severe strain im
posed by the sterling areas

lack of Canadian dollars.

Mutual Aid did not result, however* in an equilibrium in
the Canadian balance of payments with the sterling area*
Continued overseas exports at the high levels of the war
years were absolutely dependent upon continued leading by
Canada, lending which, as noted in Chapter II, Canada

1X5

could ill afford.

Fortunately, the Hutual Aid program was

only intended as a short run emergency measure? the real
adjustment that would give equilibrium in the balance of
payments was postponed until after the war*

But in spite

of the postponement even so some fundamental changes in
British-Canadian trade relations did take place as a re
sult of Hutual Aid*

A considerable portion of the Canadi

an holdings of inconvertible sterling and accumulated ex
port credits were used to repatriate British holdings of
Canadian securities*

This constituted a vital step in

Canada’s growth toward creditor nation standing.
Despite all the difficulties of the wartime dollar
shortage and the fluctuating state of Canadian exchange
reserves during the war period, the exchange rate remained
at the official rate established in 1939*
III.

POSTIvAH EXCHANGES

The main developments in the Canadian economy from
1940 to 1945 played an important role in establishing the
postwar pattern of international trade and finance.

The

most important of these developments was the basic change
in the structure of the economy and the nature of govern
ment control policies, especially those that affected the
value and direction of exports, imports, and capital
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movements.

It was also during this period (1940-45) that

the problem of financing the export surplus with the
sterling area and developing means to remove the current
account deficit with the dollar area became critical,

It

were these same problems that disrupted the Canadian bal
ance of payments in 1947 and 1948,
At the end of the war in 1945 the continued heavy
demand for Canadian exports and the satisfactory state of
the exchange reserves made it possible for the Exchange
Control Board to lower the selling rate of the Canadian
dollar from $ 1,11 to $ 1,105,

The Board also greatly

relaxed the exchange control on current payments and re
moved almost all the wartime trade restrictions.

Follow

ing the success of these changes the Board restored the
rate on the United States dollar to par with buying and
selling rates of $ 1.00 and $ 1,005 on July 6, 1946.
However, the healthy trend of 1945-46 did not
continue.

The Canadian holdings of foreign exchange fell

$ 263 million in 1946 and $ 743 million in 1947, reducing
the reserves from their peak of $ 1,508 million in 1945
to a low of $ 501 million in 1947.

The seriousness of

the exchange problem that faced Canada is evidenced by the
fact that if the average monthly loss of $ 62 million that
occurred in the first ten months of 1947 had continued,

Ill
Canada*s exchange reserves would have been completely ex
hausted by aid 3.948*

The Canadian government had a half

year before depreciation of the exchange rate was forced
upon them*1?- arlthin this time the government would have
to find some type of remedy for the balance of payments
disequilibrium that was causing the exchange difficulty*
The root causes of the difficulties of 1946 and
1947 can be found in an analysis of the factors accounting
for a demand in excess of the supplies available without
drawing on exchange reserves.12
One of the most important of these causes was the
postwar prosperity manifesting itself in a rise in con
sumption levels in 1946 and a growing rate of domestic in
vestment in 1947.

This increased consumption and invest

ment caused a greatly increased demand for American im
ports*-

At the time that the demand for dollar imports was

rising, the Canadian government -Mas financing hie sterling
areafs deficit on current^account with export credits and
loans amounting, to § 1,§09 million in this two-year period

-^Depreciation was especially undesirable at this
time since the export industries *?eFe at peak production
and the depreciation, which represents a cut in price for
these industries, would not have been able to increase de
mand relative to the price decrease* Consequently, the
depreciation would have resulted in a decrease in the bal
ance of trade*
i % o o d l y , 0£. c i t ., p* 101*
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(1945-46),

As a result of this situation a largo portion

of Canadian exports did not produce exchange that could be
used to pay for imports.
The total Canadian balance of payments showed con
siderable- overall strength during 1947 and 1948 with cur
rent surpluses Of $ 454 million and $ 85 million respee*
tively.

These surpluses are indicative of Canada’s abili

ty to obtain hard currency for all exports except those
financed by export credits and loans*

As noted previous

ly, the Canadian economy was not in a position to export
capital and in the postwar period the international ac
counts could not bear the burden of the lending program.
To understand the forces leading to the difficul
ties arising from the extension of credits and the balance
of trade, it is necessary to take account of the bilateral
disequilibrium of Canada’s postwar international trans
actions.

The sterling area represents a traditional mar

ket for a large portion of the total Canadian exports.
Due to the need© of the reconstruction program in the post
war period, the demand of the sterling area for Canadian
exports was much greater than its supply of hard currencies
to pay for them.

Canadian credits and loans were necessary

if sales to this traditional market were to be maintained.
In effect, the credit program was a means of assur-

inf domestic prosperity by providing a market for the Ca
nadian export indus try , and a me thod of speedingup Euro
pean reconstruetioa so that exports could be put on a cash
basis in the future,

this second objective is most imports

ant in the long run, since historically it has been the
surplus from overseas trade that supplied Canada with the
exchange necessary to carry on trade with the United
States*

The main objective of the credit program was to

maintain Canada^s ability to create this surplus.

However,

as Goodly pointed out, ^Because imports were purchased
largely from the United States a much larger overall sur
plus [overseas] was required than actually developed if a
loss of reserves was to be avoided*813

So when the export

of capital greatly exceeded the current account surplus,
the difference was financed by exchange reserves*
The bilateral disequilibrium of the Canadian bal
ance of payments with the dollar area was intensified in
the postwar period#

The Canadian balance On current ac

count with the United States fell from a net positive bal
ance of $ 36 million in 1945 to a net negative balance of
I 1,136 million in 1947.

Daring this period over four-

fiftfcg of total Canadian imports came from the United

States as compared with two-thirds before the war.

Cense*

quently, the Canadian demand for American dollars increased
at the same time that the supply was decreasing' as a re
sult of the foreign credit program and the inconvertibili
ty of sterling#

Several times in the past (the 1920*8 for

example) when the Canadian demand for l&iited States dollar
was greater than the supply Canada was able to make up the
difference by importing capital from the United States,
but in the period 1945-47 this was not possible,*

there

was a considerable inflow of American capital in 1944 and
1945 and the first half of 1946, but in the second half Of
1946 and in 1947 the movement practically ceased*

this

was due to the appreciation of the official rate of ex*
change and sympathetic upward movement in the unofficial
exchange market#

the inflows of capital in the prewar and

war years had been primarily the result of the discount of
the unofficial exchange rate from parity*

the reduction

in the discount fate tended, therefore, to make Canadian
investments less attractive to American -investors*

fhe

reduction of the discount rate also served as an induce*
meat to withdraw fund invested since 1.939^ and such with*
drawals acted in part to offset new inflows*

In 1947 and

1943 Canada could not offset the increased demand for
tlnited States dollars with convertible sterling or the in*
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flow of American capital,

Consequently* the deficit on

current account with the United States had to be financed
with exchange reserves*
To sum up the main elements in Canada^s pos twar
bilateral disequilibriurn on current accounts

(1) there

was a large current account surplus with the sterling area
financed mainly by Canadian credits and convertible
sterling* (2) the current account deficit with the dollar
area financed with convertible sterling received from the
sterling area and the drawing down of exchange reserves
(see Table XII )♦

The main changes from the war years were

the greatly increased current account deficit with the dol#
lar area and the disappearance of the inflow of private
capital from the United States.
In searching for a means of curing the bilateral
disequilibrium that existed in the balance of payments the
Canadian government was forced to. choose between several
alternative'methods*.

One method was to cut Off export

credits so that the net surplus on current account would
result in an addition to exchange reserves* provided* of
course* that an outflow of private capital would not off
set the decrease in credits* a movement which could be
prevented by the controlling of exchange.

This method

necessarily assumes the continuation of exports at the
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TABLE XII
MAIM METHODS OF PIHANCINU CANADA'S BILATERAL
CURRENT ACCOUNT, 1946 AND 19A?
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

Current account surplus with the sterling area
Financed byCanadian export credits and loans
Receipts of convertible sterling
Current account deficit with the dollar area
Financed by
Transfer of exchange from the sterling area
Loss of exchange reserves

1946

194?

699

8?2

436

150

328
505

30?

825

150
251

505
743

Source: William J. a. Woodly, "Canada's Post-War Balance of
Payments; A Case Study of Remedies for Balance of Payments Disequi
librium" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University,
Ithaca* 1949), p. 103.
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1947 level and the free conversion of the proceeds of
these exports.

Judging from the strained conditions of

the exchange reserves in the sterling area, the 1947 level
of Canadian exports could not be maintained unless other
countries were willing to extend credit to the sterling
area so that the proceeds could be spent in Canada.

There

fore, if other nations did not assume the burden of the
Canadian credit program with the sterling area, Canadian
overseas trade would decline as credits were curtailed.
*

Any policy that might result in a decrease in the volume
of external, trade was especially undesirable to Canada,
since a decrease of any magnitude would result in an even
greater percentage decrease in national income.14

Hence,

a policy of reducing export credits would be inconsistent
with fhe domestic policy of full employment and stable
money incomes.
Another possible remedy of the Canadian exchange
problem would be the devaluation of the Canadian dollar*

14The high Canadian export multiplier virtually
eliminates any solution that would reduce the level of for
eign trade* The Canadian multiplier has been estimated
statistically for the period 1923-39, ", * * on the av
erage over this period, an export of $ 1,00 in year R was
followed by a national income received of $ 3.80 in year
E t l . s Tse-Chun Chang, "A Note on Exports and National

In theory at least, devaluation would have the effect of
increasing the price of imports, thereby decreasing their
volume,

It would also tend to induce a greater volume of

exports because of.their reduced price in terms of foreign
currency.

However, devaluation was not practical In the

Canadian situation, because, even if it did raise the im
port price, it is doubtful if imports would have been
reduced by much.

Imports were primarily capital goods

- of highly essential supplies such as coal, iron, and
petroleum, the demand for which was relatively price in#
elastic due to the high rate of income and activity in,
Canada,

fhe prospect that devaluation would stimulate ex

ports is nullified by the fact that Canadian costs and
prices were already generally below the world level,

Ca

nadian exports were limited more by physical capacity of
the export industry than by price considerations*!®
Without an increase in exports the income effect of fhe
devaluation on the Canadian economy would be deflationary
and therefore undesirable*
A third alternative for solving the balance of pay
ments difficulties was the possibility of changing the
direction of Canadian exports either by direct controls or

i5Hoodly, op« pit,, p, 163,-
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under the stimulus, of price and credit restrictions*

This

technique would attempt to remedy the geographic imbalance
in the, trade pattern and thereby solve the exchange prob1

lem,

In reality this would direct Canadian exports away

from the sterling area to the dollar market*

This policy

offers a practical, solution, but not a complete one*

fhe

restriction of exports to the sterling area is counter to
Canadian long-term trade policy, which has been directed
toward maintaining the traditional overseas market*
A fourth alternative is the reduction of imports,
by higher prices or direct control,

This would have the

effect of reducing the volume of imports to a level
where the proceeds of existing exports would be sufficient
to pay for imports without drawing on exchange reserves*
This remedy is of questionable value* because a rise in
the price of imports would be inflationay and counter to
the existing government anti-inflation policy.

An in

crease in the domestic price level would tend to reduce
exports and start a decrease in the total foreign trade
with undesirable multiple effects on the national income*
In November of 1947 the Canadian government an
nounced its program for remedying the exchange problem*
The over-all intention of the program was to meet the
emergency situation in terms of the long-run adjustments
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that were necessary to put the Canadian balance of pay
ments in fundamental equilibrium*
of the program were:

The immediate objects

(1) decrease imports from the United

States where payments had to be made in United States dol
lars, (2) increase imports from other countries where pay
ments were made in other currencies, particularly pound
sterling, (3) increase exports to the dollar area, (4) re
duce the amount of export credits extended to other coun
tries, particularly the United Kingdom*1®

To achieve

these objectives the government adopted stringent direct
controls over imports and provided encouragement to certain
types of exports.

The import quotas and restrictions were

imposed in such a way that they reduced imports from the
United States without affecting foreign trade with other
areas*

Wartime export controls were relaxed and the cred

its to European countries were reduced with the result
that exports were directed to the United States,

In addi

tion, the government provided subsidies for the gold
mining industries, attempted to direct industrial develop
ment so that goods would be produced in Canada both to re»

place imports and to sell abroad, anc z;egotiated a loan

^Canadian Government, Department of External Affairs,
C anada^ Foreign Trade. Reference Papers, Ro. 30 (Ottawa:
Department of External Affairs, August, 1948), p. 3*
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from the Export Import Bank in Washington.

The reason the

government gave for adopting this type of policy was that
the measures involved were superior to the only real alter
native which was depreciation and deflation.

The main

argument advanced by the government was that direct con
trols would have the least dislocating effect on the econ
omy as a whole since they could be applied in a selective
manner.

With selective controls, restrictions and prohi

bitions could be placed on those imports that were least
essential, and particularly on those that increased the
imbalance in Canada’s bilateral account.
The major part of the government’s remedial program
was contained in the Emergency Exchange Conservation Aot
of 1948.

Under this Act imported goods were arranged in

three "schedules*1 according to their importance to the
Canadian economy.

Schedule I goods were luxury goods» the

importation of which could be curtailed without hardship.
This class of goods was subject to severe prohibition.
Schedule II goods were consumers goods, the volume of
which could be reduced materially without an adverse ef
fect on welfare.

This class of goods was subject to

quotas based on the volume of trade in prewar years,
Schedule III goods were capital goods, machinery, and
component parts of durable consumers goods which were con-

sldered''necessary" for fhe efficient functioning of the
econ#iy#:
' ImportationOf this class of goods required alicense*-^/;'
::
i.fhe' iii^tiange Conservation Act followed the gener
al objective of deducing imports from the dollar area
without cartailing the opportunities of exporters in the
sterling and other soft currency areas*

tinder the Act

prohibitions were placed on schedule I goods that came
predominantly from the dollar area*

fhe quota# on sched

ule IT goods were, arranged' in such a. way that they favored
import#, from the sterling area and restricted those from
the dollar:ares*;

fhe administration of. schedule 1X1 was ■

carried ■on -in„..a .
manner devised to ■direct Canadian. iadtts<-'
trial development Into a form that would make Canada less
dependent on imports of capital goods and component parts*
and more capable of maintaining it# exports to the dollar
area*
During IDAS the disequilibrium in the Canadian bal- ance'of payments was reduced and the reserves of foreign
e « h a a g e ;'increase#1by $ 4S§ million* ■fhe principal changes
in the balance of payments were in the capital an# current
11'i i

• 17D0minion of Canada, ^Statutory Orders & Regula
tions,” fhe Panada Gazette.Part XX, No* 8*43* ?fel*-LXXXXX-

(April

ifr^r^tr^
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account with the United States.

On capital account there

was an increase in government borrowing in the Waited
States and an inflow of private capital from the United
States.

On current account the net negative balance with

the United States was reduced from $ 1,135 in 1947 to
$ 393 million in 1943.

A number of factors can be cited

to account for the changes in the balance of payments,
among the most important were:

<1) changes in the volume

and direction of trade, (2) the provision for dollar
financing of Canadian exports by the Economic Cooperation
Administration, and (3) the decrease in Canadian export
credits.

Concerning the government policy and its influ

ence on these changes, Goodly contends, that * . . . the
«

effect of import controls program of Jlarcb 1947 was large
ly indirect, as it prevented imports from increasing in
response to higher prices and incomes in Canada."18
fhe principal change that took place in the volume
and direction of trade in 1948 was the increase of exports
to the United States which rose from $ 1*057 million in
1947 to $ 1,516 in 1948.

fhis increase was the result of

the diversion of exports from the sterling area as a
consequence of the more stringent import controls imposed

i8tf©odly, oj>* c i t . , p. 218.

by -overseas countries *-;e>nd,.. the removal of Canadian export
controls* which had prevented Canadian exports of such
goods as coarse grains and pork from going to the United
States*,' Another1factor was the. 'strong demand ■of American
prodaeers for primary products produced in Canada due to
the high-level' of American economic aeiivityv
Another significant development in the volume and
direction of Canadian trade which took place in 1948 was
the strong increase in the total Canadian imports from
the sterling area#.

The increase in imports from the

sterling, area meant that Canada was able to either fi- .
nance a greater total export to the sterling area-with.a.
given amount of export credits# or reduce the volume of
export credits without a decrease in the total Canadian
exports#'since-the sterling area was paying for imports
with goods rather than with funds borrowed from Canada#
Canada chose' the latter alternative, so that the net
result of the increased imports from .the sterling area
was the strengthening'

of

the Canadian export industries

by preventing, -a decline in total Canadian exports when
overseas- export credits were reduced*'
Paring lit® .merchandise imports from the'’United
States were reduced by only $ 189 million*

However* the

net effect' Of the other changes, in the balance of pay
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ments was a reduction in the demand for American dollars
and an increase in the amount of hard currency coming from
the overseas area.
Canadian loans and export credits to foreign coun
tries amounted to $ 563 million in 1947%

In 1948 the

volume of lending was cut to $ 167 million,.
tors were responsible for this reduction*

Several fac
In early 1948

the drawing rate on the $ 1,250 million export credit to
Great Britain was reduced,

throughout 1948 other debtor

nations did not draw heavily on their credits due to the
improvement in their balance of payments or the availa
bility of Economic Gooperation Administration funds.
Provisions of the United States* Economic Cooper
ation Act o f .1948* which permitted nations receiving
assistance to make woffshore” purchases in Canada, re
sulted in the United States financing a large share of
Canadian exports to the United Kingdom, especially those
under the food contracts between the two nations.

Prior

to receiving BCA aid the United Kingdom had used Canadian
export credits to finance a large portion of her food
imports from Canada*

Therefore, BCA financing reduced

the United Kingdom’s drawings on Canadian export credits
and permitted Canada to earn increased amounts of United
States dollars in 1948%

The BCA program was also impor

tant to Canada in that it helped assure a continuation of
Canadian exports on a-high level in 1949 and subsequent
years *i9
•to -sawiari'ase the developments of 1948* when foreign
loans were curtailed and exports wore financed by funds
provided by the Economic Cooperation Administration, and
when a larger portion of exports went to the United
States, the bilateral disequilibrium in the Canadian bal
ance of payments disappeared*

the Canadian government

gave confirmation of the improvement in the situation when
it announced on December 15, 1948 that import controls had
been relaxed on a large number of goods*

Early in 1949

the United Kingdom was permitted to resume drawing on the
1946 loan at the rate of $ 10 million a month*
fhe basic changes in the Canadian balance of pay
ments held good in 1949 as exports to the United States
remained at their high levels and imports from the United
Kingdom increased*

A return of the difficulties of 1946-

47 was still possible* but highly improbable,

Canada was

dependent upon ECA funds for the financing of a large share
of its overseas exports.

However, the prospects for fhe

maintenance of the high postwar level of foreign trade

19I b i d . , p. 266
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were extremely good*

The American demand f or primary

products such as wood pulp, newsprint, and non-ferrous
metals was strong due to the high levels of income and
employment in the United States#

The. most doubtful item

in the Canadian balance of payments on current account in
1349 was the volume of manufactured exports*

The contin

ued success of this class of exports was dependent upon
the degree of recovery in the United Kingdom*
The most significant development in Canadian inter
national finance during 1949 was the September 19th de
valuation of the Canadian dollar to buying and selling
rates of $ 1*10 US and $ 1*105 respectively following the
United Kingdom1s 30*5 percent reduction in the value of
the pount sterling#

The devaluation had mixed effects on

the Canadian foreign trade position*

The most unfavorable

of these was the inflation of domestic price levels as a
result of the rise in the price of imports*

The index of

Canadian wholesale prices rose from 198.3 in 1949 to 211.2
in 1950.

The most favorable effect of the devaluation was

the increase in merchandise exports to the United States,
the total value rising from $ 1,529 million in 1949 to
$ 2 ,050 million in 1950.

However* despite this increase

in eiqports to the United States Canada experienced a net
deficit on current account of $ 329 million; the first over-
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all deficit on current account since 1933,

fhe net defi

cit on current account did not, however, put a strain on
exchange reserves, which increased by $ 655 million during
1950,
fhe main reason for the favorable growth in exchange
reserves, despite the unfavorable balance on current ac
count, was the changed direction of trade and the increased .
capital inflow from the United States,

fhe pattern of Ca

nadian trade with the main trading areas of the world
Showed a marked change during 1950^

In 1939 the United

States supplied 66 percent of Canadian imports while tak
ing 41 percent of exports*. In 1950 these figures nearly
balanced, when the United States supplied 67 percent of
Canadian imports while taking $5 percent of Canadian ex
ports*
fhe problem of cross payments between bilateral in
ternational accounts was not serious during 1950,

fhe

devaluation had acted to solidify and make permanent the.
changes in the direction of trade that had taken place in
1948 and 1949,

fhe overall Canadian balance of payments

was more nearly in balance despite the fact that it showed
a deficit oh current account,

With the bilateral accounts

in an approximate balance the former heavy overseas sur
plus was no longer required as a means of financing,

Ear-
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lag the first ten months: of 1950 exchange reserves in
creased by $ 560 million due primarily to the heavy inflow
of capital from the Onited States#

A large part of this

inflow was speculative capital attracted by the devaluation
of the Canadian dollar and the prospects of an appreciation
in the exchange rate in the near future*

tith the bilat*

eral accounts already in balance this inflow of American
capital was not a stabilising factor in the Canadian bal
ance of payments and it placed a heavy strain on the ex
change rate 4

Maintaining the official exchange rate in

the face of this heavy capital inflow meant a strong in
flationary pressure was placed on the domestic economy,
the Bank of Canada attempted to offset this pressure by
raising the discount rate from 1 to 1^ percent In October,
1950,

However, the inflow of capital continued and# when

the strain on the exchange rate became excessive, the Ca
nadian government announced that the exchange rate would
be freed and allowed to seek its own level in the open
market#

.

lit

m m msmam

f i r s t ' step toward the freeing of t h e Canadian ■

exchange .rate, was taken on September 30, 10S0 when the
Canadian government announced the cancellation of the of*
fieial exchange rate that had' been in f orce since Septem* '
b#r of 1949*

fhe rate was left free to find its own

level ss/detefffiiaed'by supply and demand*

fhis, however,

does-, not constitute a free; exehange rate since the general
.strnciare’-ef'ejscehange control remained unchanged*! Permit
and license'.provisions for the control of securities
transactions.by residents and non-residents and the pay*
ment of Canadian dollars to non-residents remained in
effect,.

The limitation on the issue of these* permits’and•

licenses remained strict:*;

.

It was the government's; inten*

tion to retain the structure of control is such a way as
to fora a defence- against possible adverse conditions in
the future*

ifree exchange, as distinguished from a rate free to
fluctuate within a framework of control, is one that is
allowed to fluetitate under the influence of market supply
and demand without governmental interference of'.any kind*

The immediate cause of the partial freeing of the
exchange rate was the extremely heavy inflow of specula*
tlve American capital that followed the devaluation of
September 1949.

From June to September of 1950 exchange

reserves were increased by $ 543 million and stood at a re
cord high of $ 1*789 million.

The gross inflow of capital

in the month of September alone was $ 280 million.

The

heavy influx of funds coming as it did in the midst of the
Canadian investment boom excercised an inflationary force
at a time when the Canadian government1® economic policy
in all fields was directed toward combating inflation.
The outstandingly large balance of the Canadian
exchange reserves that resulted fro# the capital inflow
meant an increase in Canada*s gross foreign debt and
annual service charge without a corresponding increase
in productive resources or the ability to export.
'■v

This

type of involuntary borrowing is especially undesirable
since it represents a potential strain on the balance of
payments.

Since a large portion of the inflow was based

on speculation as to the future exchange rate, the re
establishing of parity between the Canadian and American
dollar would retard the inflow of speculative capital, but
at the same time it would have an adverse effect on the
balance bn current account with the United Kingdom.

De*

valuation had been undertaken m
overseas trade in balance,

a means of keeping' the

fhe object of the exchange

controi aUthority:is to select a rate that is consistent
with fohda^hfat-'conditions and has premise of remaining
stable*-;

1950 the Canadian situation was such' that it

was; difficulty if. not impossible, to select one rate that,
woiild be in complete harmony with fundamental conditions
and not require strict supervision to maintain*2

An in-

flexible; exchange rate would hardly have been desirable to
Canada since it would have forced the domestic economy to
make immediate adjustments to external situations that were
essentially shortgun in nature,of capital is o case in point.

The speculative inflow
If the rate was raised so

as to ewrtail the inflow of capital, yet at the same time
was so High that it had an adverse effect on the trade
with the Overseas area, the rigid maintenance of the high
rate would mean that the economy would have to suffer all
the undesirable effects of a reduction in foreign trade to
avoid the inflationary force of the capital inflow*

If ex

change control Cannot promise to give a reasonably stable
rate without forcing the economy to make drastic adjust*
meats to maintain that rate, then it seems that the only

2®-©andd.tao- Exchange Rate,11 International Financial
Survey* Ilf:- {doteber S*. 1.9i#l,--l.d9*:
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reasonable course is to allow the market forces to deter
mine the rate;
The final step in the freeing of the exchange rate
came on December 14, 1951 when the Canadian government
revoked all existing foreign exchange control regulations*
This action was the culmination of the gradual relaxation
of exchange controls that had taken place during 1950 and
1951,

All import restrictions and prohibitions under the

Emergency Exchange Conservation Act had been removed on
January 2, 1950.

By the time that exchange controls were

fully eliminated they had come to play only a very small
part in the operation of the economy.
The decision to abolish controls was not, as the
decision to allow the rate to fluctuate freely, a means
of meeting a current problem*
has a fundamental implication.

Freeing of the exchanges
It does not mean, as

D. C. Abbot points out, that the future of the Canadian
economy is so bright that there would no longer be any
use for controls.^

Rather it implies that the Canadian

situation is such that she is better advised to rely on
the general handling of the domestic economy to maintain

3

B.
c. Abbot, "Statement to the House of Commons,
December 14, 1951, Report to the Kinister of Finance
(Ottawa* Foreign Exchange ControL Board, 3*951), p, IS,
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a reasonable balance with the world instead of attempting
to administrate the balance*

The question narrows down to

whether continued exchange control as a long-run policy
would be advantageous to the Canadian economy*
The question is couched in terms of national policy
and, therefore, must be answered with reference to partic
ular Canadian conditions and attitudes*

However, there is

also a theoretical issue involved in the decision to free
exchanges that must not be overlooked.

The theoretical

issue relates to what has been called the ndoetrine of
alternative stability.18 Simply stated, this doctrine is
that a nation cannot persue an independent monetary policy
and at the same time decree a fixed exchange rate*4

A

nation must choose between internal and external stability,
Because, if a country has committed itself to a policy of
maintaining a price level at odds with the world* it will
necessarily find that its exchange rate will not be stable*
Which is only to say that when a country follows measures
to stabilize the internal economy difficulties will arise
in the balance of payments which can only be met by direct
controls over imports and other payments or by allowing

4Leland B* Yeager, *An Evaluation of Freely Fluctu
ating Exchange Kates*8 (unpublished Pectoral Dissertation,
Columbia University, Hew York, 1952), p* 24*
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the exchange rate to depreciate,

Meade contends that

* . , ♦ to work simultaneously for domestic full employ
ment policies, free trade, and fixed exchange rates, is to
work for a system which cannot work*00

The Canadian gov

ernment has a policy of internal monetary stability and a
policy of full employment which according to the doctrine
of alternative stability cannot consistently be followed
when decreeing a fixed exchange rate.

Therefore, the

question of whether it is better to sacrifice internal or
external stability stands behind the decision to free ex
changes. The answer to this question can be found in a
review of Canadian monetary, trade, and fiscal policies,
resource development

and industrialization, and the

future prospects of the balance of payments.
Monetary policy.

For an investment economy like

that of the United States, where the balance of payments
is largely determined by internal conditions, it is fea
sible to seek a correction of balance of payments diffi
culties by adjusting domestic factors with the convention
al instruments of monetary policy, viz,, the discount rate
and open market operations.

In an export economy like

5j, E. Meade, "Review of Wilcox*s A Charter for
World Trade," ficOnomica (May, 1950), 217, (cited by
Yeager, Ibid.»np T
'
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Canada, whose balance of payments is determined mainly by
conditions abroad, domestic monetary adjustments do not
offer an sdeouate remedy to balance of payments problems#
Exchange controls are much more effective than
conventional domestic monetary policies, because as Mallich
points out?

wEven though exchange control often is a care

aimed only at the symptoms of the maladjustment, it may be
the best that can be done when the causes are beyond the
policymaker’s reach#**®
In general the case against exchange control with
its technical complications, its difficulty to administer,
and adverse repercussions is strong when alternative
monetary policy can be used to divorce internal monetary
and fiscal affairs from unfavorable external conditions#
However, in an export economy like Canada, there is a
relatively greater need for exchange controls that make
them feasible under the conditions of a unfavorable bal
ance of payments#
Current account deficits are a serious threat to
the stability of the Canadian economy#

As noted previous

ly, Canadian exports are predominantly raw materials and
basic commodities the supply of which is relatively in-

®Henry Christopher Hallich, ffonetarv Problems of an
Export Economy (Cambridgei Harvard University Press,

TW077 pTTBT#
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elastic.

Difficulties in financing exports directly af

fect the level of Canadian economic activity.

Exchange

control, therefore, is a desirable method of meeting def
icits on current account and preventing disruption in the
export industry.

Another argument in favor of exchange

control in Canada in place of other monetary policies is
dependent upon the convertibility of sterling,

Goodly

says that:
, , . when currencies become inconvertible, the
important policy issues of individual governments
become exchange rates, methods of avoiding loss of
reserves, and problems of conducting trade while
balancing bilateral accounts,7
Under these circumstances traditional monetary policies
are inadequate and make exchange control necessary.
Another factor favoring exchange controls in Canada is
the large size of the balance of payments in relation to
national income.
Exchange controls on capital movements are not
desirable from the Canadian point of view.

Existing Ca

nadian exchange controls on capital movements were de
signed to prevent capital flight,
that:

iCallich points out

'The great volume of these movements * « * was made

^Viiliam J, E. Woodly, 3Canada#s Post-Var Balance
of Fayments; A Case Study of Remedies for Balance of Pay
ments Disequilibrium" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation,
Cornell University, Ithaca, 1949), p. 17.
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possible o n l y by the high liquidity of the more mature
economies, a factor that normally is absent in underdevel
oped countries**'8

Although Canada is not an nodefdevel*

oped economy her position is such that the major disturb*’
ance in the capital account can he due only, to the cessa
tion of the inflow of capital over a long period rather
than the flight of domestic funds*

Any type of exchange

control that would discourage foreign investment would be
a distinct

disadvantage to Canada*

The Canadian war and

postwar exchange controls recognised this fact and.made
special provisions for the withdrawal of funds invested
after controls had been imposed*
in 1950 the main argument for the removal of ex
change control was that it would help relieve fhe infla
tionary pressure that was being exerted by the rapid in
flow of foreign capital*

Thus exchange control# although

able to eope with the balance of payments on current ac*
count problems of the export economy, cannot offer sta
bility to the internal economy*

It was later found that

when the rate was freed an appreciation took place due
to the heavy demand for the Canadian dollar and .the in
flow of capital slowed down to a point where traditional

8¥allich, op* cit*, p. 258.
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central bank policies could deal with the inflation.
The conclusion then from the viewpoint of monetary
policy is that exchange control in Canada was desirable
on current account operations rather than on capital ac
count, and that in emergency cases such as a deficit on
current account exchange controls were more desirable
than traditional monetary policies due to the nature of
the economy and the structure of the balance of payments.
Trade policy.

In relation to trade policy the

question was whether Canadian exchange controls would
result in greater gains from international trade.

That

is, by improving the terms of trade it was thought that
the better trade relations could be achieved.

In theory

exchange controls increase the terms of trade by permit
ting the maintenance of an overvalued rate of exchange.
However, in practice only an overvaluation of the most
severe sort would substantially increase the terms of
trade in Canada’s favor since the price elasticities of
goods entering Canada’s foreign trade under the conditions
that prevail in the postwar world markets were such that
changes in the par value of exchange would have little
effect on their volume*^

C, Clark, Canada’s Post-i/ar Finance, Statements
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The dost conclusive argument against control as an
adjunct to Canadian foreign trade policy is the Canadian
disposition to import from the Uhited States and to export
to Western Europe*

Experience has shews that exchange

controls cannot correct this geographic imbalance in the
patters of trade, especially since* as noted previously,
the articles exported to Western Europe cannot be sold in
the United States,

Consequently, exchange controls as a

national policy or as a policy in the world at large
only aggravate the Canadian situation by making the con
vertibility of currency difficult or impossible and there*
by making the balancing of the Canadian payments exceed*
ihgly difficult*
To summarize, the Canadian foreign trade is espe
cially opposed to exchange controls as a method of im
proving the nation’s trade position*

Canada*® dependence

on foreign trade and the geographic imbalance of the trade
pattern put Canada in a very weak bargaining position in
bilateral negotiations.

Exchange controls can only offer

temporary relief from Canada’s trade problems so that
^Canada’s long-run external trade policy seeks the estab-

and Speeches Wo* 52/59* (Ottawa: Department of External
Affairs, December 29, 1952), p, 11*

lisiusent of-international commerce at the highest level
possible oh a multilateral basis * • ■ ■
■/Since-Krerld Mar If Canada has been a strong support*
er of international ■organizations/■that a t t e s t ,t© reduce
the restrictions on international trade*

Canada Is a

signatory.: of ..the Bret ton Hoods Agreement- and a. participant
in ;the-,'Iiiteriiatlbnal -Eoneiary Fundf ■ Blyffc contends that?
"The significance of the Fund to Canada probably lies in
the place which it has in the efforts for the ■restoration
• . 1C

• ''

••

.

of international trade on a saul tiiateral basis.

Fur

ther evidence of £anadars opposition, to barriers to -inter
national trade ©an be found in the-fact that in- the general
Agreement on tariffs and Trade at the Geneva Conference of
1948 Canada granted concessions on 1,000 eat Of the 2,000
items- on her tariff list.
Resource development and indUs.trial.lza.tion.. 'there'
are several ways in which exchange control can be used to '
promote resource developiBent and industrialization.

One

l^Canadian Government, Department of External Af».
fair9v-^^BMia■iB,^j^gaigB:.imB&^' lefereace Papers f Ho. 36
(Ottawa;? department of External Affairs, August, 1948),
p. 3.
ilc. ij, Biyth, ^some Aspects of canada*s internationsl.Financial .Eolations," .Capadl^b dournal of Iconoia*
ic.S and -Political- fc.leaee:r %It (August, 1946), 311.
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is to give a preferential rate to export industries by re
straining the importation of competing goods through a
•

licensing system or through unfavorable exchange rates.
Another way is the diversion of exchange resources from
imports for domestic consumption to imports
equipment,

of capital

A third way is the subsidization of the domes**

tic industries using imported raw materials through liber
al allocation of exchange and a favorable rate,12
Canadian attempts to improve domestic industry
through the use of exchange controls have been unsatis
factory,

For instance, under the Emergency Exchange Con

servation Act and its restrictions of imports incidental
protection was given to several industries.

This protec-

'tion had the effect of stimulating high cost uneconomic
production of some of the goods subject to control and
introduced distortions and rigidities in the Canadian econ
omy,

This ran counter to Canadian interests because as

Clark points out,
It lias clearly realized, however, that if Canada
was to continue to market her exports in the United
States in large volume, It was essential to keep costs
down, encourage productive efficiency, maintain compe
tition and retain sufficient flexibility in the econo
my to permit adjustments to the inevitable shocks of a
dynamic and rapidly changing world.13

^U'alllch, QP» cit., pp. 264-85,
13Clark, op. cit.. p. 10,
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fhe protective function of exchange control was, therefore,
undesirable in the Canadian situation*

ft protection was

desired, it could have been better achieved, in the Sana*
dian case at least, bf direct subsidies*

ifallich advances

two reasons that support this contention!
V

(1)
* *; * exchange control as an instrument of pro*
tecfion lends itself peculiarly to the dispensation of
special privilege, (!) * . . administrative character
of exchange control maxes the protection it provides
rather less certain than that provided by tariffs,*4
Although Canadian exchange controls have been care*
fully constructed so as not to interfere with the Inflow
of foreign capital, there is an inherent danger that eon; trols will lead to a decrease in the inflow of foreign
capital,

Canada is practically self-sufficieot in respect

to capital so that a curtailment of foreign investment
would not seriously offset the internal development pro
gram*

However, it would have an adverse effect on the

importation of technical shill that usually accompanies
direct investment and upon which Canada has been dependent
in the past for a large part of its innovative progress*
Fiscal policy*

Clark has outlined the postwar Ca

nadian fiscal policy as being directed toward!

14Wallich, op* c i t ** p. 265,
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(1) smoothing the transition from war to peace,
(2) restoring and maintaining a free enterprise econ
omy of a dynamic and flexible character, <3) promoting
a high level of employment and income, and (4) con
taining the inflationary potential latent in huge war
deferred demand and high consumer liquidity.iS
Exchange controls could and did play a role in helping to
achieve these objectives, but always this role has been
that of a temporary expedient.

Indeed, it could hardly

have been more in view of the strong Canadian presumption
t%
against government interference in economic affairs.
Exchange controls have been important in the fiscal
policies of hatin American countries mainly because of the
income that can be secured from differential buying and
selling rates or a tax on exchange transactions.

Although

in the case of Canada the income from such a practice
could be substantial, it is extremely doubtful that it
would be treated as anything but an added inducement to
having controls.

Income could not be the main reason for

exchange control in the Canadian case.
Foreign repercussions,

fhe imposition or continued

existence of Canadian exchange control is not solely a Ca
nadian matter.

Canada's share in world trade is large and

many nations are affected by Canada's action on trade mat-

i5Clark, oj>. c i t ., p. 11.

1M
ters*

The pos twar international f inancial situation is

such that Canada*s actions in regard to exchange control
will have/ serious.reperoussions* 'Canada*s role is a dual
one*,

She'has suffered a dollar shortage* hut at the same

•

time the nations of Hesters Europe have been plagued: with:
a shortage of Canadian dollars*

Restrictions on Canadian

currency have an immediate effect on. Ifestern Europe, which
depends heavily on daoada for imports*

Canadian exchange

control practice must always keep sight of the fact that
tight

exchanges could lead to a reduction in the over*

seas trade as a result of the redirection of European
exports*
Canadian exchange control cannot, however* have
much effect on multilateral trade*

As Ifallich. says,

"InconvertiMli ty of the currencies of an export economy
is not nearly so contagious, in fact much less so than in
proportion to bargaining power and size*

The Canadian

dollar is not a key currency, a fact which further limits
repercussions on multilateral trade*

But since Canada is

a leading advocate of nniltilaterialismand has a consid
erable stake in the revestablishment of multilateral trade#
a policy of exchange control is inconsistent and undesirable*

i%allieh,. op* c i t *, p. 271*
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The prospective balance of payments.

Among the Ca

nadian developments that give promise of contributing to
the correction of the fundamental disequilibrium in the
balance of payments are the rapidly increasing population,
expanded resource development, and the prospects of con
tinued high level

of exports to the United States.

The rapid development of Canadian population in
recent years promises to have a distinct effect on the
future balance of payments.

Watts contends that:

One effect should be to reduce troublesome exports
surpluses in some products? this is already noticea
ble in certain foods items where in some instances
it would not require very much greater local demand
to mop up present export surpluses.i7
An equally important effect should be the broadening of
the home market for manufactured items, which are at pre
sent experiencing difficulty in the export markets.

In

creased population will provide a profitable market for
the domestic production of goods formerly exported.

The

net effect of increasing population should be a lessening
of the Canadian susceptibility to variations in foreign
trade.

^7G* S. Watts, "Some Long Term Factors in the Cana
dian Balance of International Payments,* Canadian Journal
fifcWiUSA
PffiU.tUa*, Ssd&m&t XVI (February, 1955),'
20.

Resource developBients are of the utmost importance
in assessing the future eondition of the Canadian situa
tion both internally and.On the balance, of payments,

fro*

grams are under way in the preduo lion, of oil , gold, base ., .
metals, iron ore, and pulp and paper products.

Ail of

these goods are imported, but the most important in the

='

point of sine and the balance of payment# is the develop*
meat of the petroleum resources*

Since 1929 imports of

petroleum have averaged about seven percent of total im
ports, and around nine percent of imports from the Western
hemisphere*

bevelopmeats in petroleum bear directly on

the balance of payments with the baited States,

Iveh if

new discoveries do not make Canada self-sufficient\io
petroleum, they will at least reduce imports which are
virtually ail of dollar origin*

certain mineral develop*

meats also give great promise of Improving the balance on
current account with the United States*
this class of exports is almost assured*

An increase in
Watts supports

this contention by saying that better resources of the
United States have “declined to a point were there will be
a progressively better market for Canadian metals not only
for new discoveries, but for a larger portion of current
outputs as well.^i3

It appears, therefore, that if devel-
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opmental programs in petroleum, base metals, and forest
products are successful, the net effect will be to reduce
the chronic deficit on current account with the United
States,
hemand for Canadian ^xperts* .■A significant factor
in the success of the resource development in particular
and the stability of the balance of payments in general
is the level Of American demand for Canadian exports^
Conditions in 1949 and 1950 seem to indicate that the bi*lateral disequilibrium in Canada*s international accounts
has been remedied temporarily at least,

However, there
»*

was

still some evidence of a continuing fundamental .dia*

equilibrium*

the most obvious indication of this under*

lying situation was the Canadian dependence on HCA funds
to support a large share of her overseas exports*

The

final remedy for the fundamental disequilibrium rests
primarily on a permanent shift in the direction of Cana*
dian trade.

The shift that must be made in order to bring

Canadian trade into line with the state Of world demand
is an increase in exports to the united States and an in*
crease in imports from Western Europe and the United King*
dom*

Some success was made along these lines in 1948 and

1949, but the promise of the continuation of the new de*
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velopments is too slim to sefve as the basis for free exchanges#

Developments in 1050, however, have made a con**

siderable change in the situation*

the Korean War'and the

general unsettled state of international relations have
caused many nations to institute armaments programs#

In

the economic Sense this bids fair for Canada sinc e her
exports of raw materials form an important part In the
armaments programs of many nations, especially the United
States*
The long-run possibility of stable and diversified
exports to the United states depends upon the continued
economic stability at high levels of activity in the
United States, and upon tariff concessions that would open
up a larger and more permanent market for Canadian pro
ducts, which at present are barred from the American mar
ket,

There is, however, definite limits on the size of

Canadian exports to the United States in normal times since
the principal components of the trade are goods in the
field of primary products*
Conclusion*

Thus, on the basis of the situation

that existed in Canada in 1081, the case for exchange con*
tr'ols was not strong*

Although fundamental disequilibrium

still existed in the balance of payments, there was not

much that exchange control coaid do about remedying it
since the necessary adjustments were long-run and depend
ent in large part on conditions outside of Canada,

Hit

general consensus of fiscal* monetary* and trade policy
was opposed to exchange control as anything hat a tempo*
rary emergency policy*

In fact* the Canadian situation

was such that a continued use of exchange controls could
only result in an intensification of the existing problems#

A change in the rate could not he avoided* but the

question of what the new rate should be was an unanswer*
able oho*

fhe possibility of choosing an unenforceable

rate* that is .one which would reduce foreign trade and
instigate domestic deflation, or one that would en
courage a continued inflow of speculative capital which
would add to the inflationary tendency of the domestic
*
■
economy* were dangers that could only be avoided by al
lowing the rate to freely fluctuate according to market
demand and supply.

It would seem theft that the classic

/arguments for free trade and unrestricted international
financial transactions are especially applicable to the
Canadian 'case*
fhe Canadian removal of exchange controls is a
reaffirmation of the validity of the general theory of
international trade and* even more, a vote of confidence

15?

in its value as a workable and desirable phase of national
economic policy.

However, it is made quite clear by a

review of the Canadian case that with the modern resurgence
of mercantilistic policy in the disrupted postwar inter*
national trade pattern, the classical general theory of
international trade has in fact become a special case and
it is only applied with success when the underlying real
economic conditions in the nation

considering policy is*

sues is identical with those conditions assumed implicit*
ly or explicitly by the classical theory.

One could easi

ly develop the argument that the Canadian trade situation
in ,1951*52 is closely akin to that of England during the
first half of the 19th century when the classical theory
was formulated.

Canada^s situation in the modern world

is, however, a unique one.

fhen Canada is compared with

her contemporaries, England for example, it becomes obvi
ous that although the theoretical arguments and abstract
considerations of the value of free exchange are the
same, the particular dynamic features of the two economies
are such that the same working policies are impossible
or could only be imposed at greatly different costs.
Canada is Fortunate in that the free play of eco
nomic forces and her particular position are such that she
was forced to arrive at the decision to free exchanges and

that conscious pciicy formulations were only of secondary

i m p o r t a n c e . . . • ■'
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